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BOUNDARIES: DESCRIPTION v. SURVEY 
Olin L. Browder, Jr.* 
No. 5 
"The lines run and marked on the ground are the true 
survey, and when they can he found will control the calls 
for a natural or other fixed boundary; and also constitute the 
boundaries in the grant where they differ from those pro-
duced by the courses and distances stated in the patent. This 
well-settled rule in cases of lands granted by the common-
wealth, applies to grants by indi'lliduals.'11 
"The plat is only intended to he a representation of the 
actual survey as made upon the land itself. It is in the nature 
of a certified copy of an instrument which will he controlled 
by the original."2 
THESE propositions I first encountered as a student in law school. At that time they struck me as rather startling propositions, which 
could not be reconciled with other things I had learned about the law 
of conveyancing. I do not recall exactly how they were disposed of: 
whether they were to be regarded as the law on the subject or merely 
as a couple of striking aberrations. There were too many other matters 
demanding attention at that time to allow much fretting over so small 
a question. Upon returning to the classroom some years later-but 
now sitting on the other side of the desk-I had to cope with these 
cases again. Now it was not so easy to pass them off; and so I have 
been confidently announcing for some time that this was not the law, 
or at least should not be. Still I could not be sure, at least of what the 
law was, for, so far as I could tell, nobody had ever gone into it very 
far. I thought perhaps the question had not come up very often; for 
if it had, we would have heard more about it. This probably served 
as a basis for my pronouncements to students; for unless there were 
extensive authority for the above-quoted propositions, it seemed doubt-
"'Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 Burkholder v. Markley, 98 Pa. 37 at 40 (1881). 
2 Whitehead v. Ragan, 106 Mo. 231 at 235, 17 S.W. 307 (1891). 
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ful that they could or would :6.nd general acceptance. But I was not 
content to leave the question there, and so set off to see what could be 
found in the reports, moved principally to satisfy my own curiosity. 
The number of relevant cases turned up in this inquiry proved to be 
all out of proportion to the magnitude of the question. But I had a 
growing feeling that, however narrow the question might be, the 
answer might have not a little practical value to conveyancers by and 
large. So I saw the matter through, and this article is a report of that 
endeavor. 
We should be clear to begin with what·the question is. The two 
statements quoted above are two aspects of the same problem: can 
extrinsic evidence be admitted in an action at law concerning the 
boundaries of land conveyed to prove that prior to the effectuation of 
the conveyance a survey was made of the land to be conveyed, or that 
the parties otherwise designated on the ground the land to be conveyed; 
and if such facts can be proved, will they overcome and take the place 
of an inconsistent but otherwise express and unambiguous description 
in the instrument? Putting it more briefly, will the boundaries desig-
nated by the parties on the ground control the boundaries described 
in the deed? For convenience the affirmative answer to this question 
will be referred to as "the rule" in the discussion which follows; and 
the cases will be discussed in terms of being for or against the rule, 
without further restatement of it, except where qualifications found 
in the cases are reported. 
Any such sweeping statement of this problem is bound to leave 
some doubt as to its full extent or application. And there are some 
similar and related questions which are easily confused with it. For 
these reasons it is desirable to list those problems which are to be dis-
tinguished from the question at hand and excluded from the discussion 
of it. 
Excluded Doctrines, Rules, or Problems 
I. The rule of construction that calls for monuments control calls 
for courses and distances or other calls of lesser rank, and the various 
exceptions to this rule. Unfortunately there are many cases in which 
a call for a monument was given priority, but the result was explained 
by the statement that "monuments control courses and distances," 
which may leave the impression that a marked boundary may prevail 
even if not called for.3 Unless one is careful, such a result may follow 
3 E.g.: Merlino v. Eannotti, (Pa. Super. 1955) 110 A. (2d) 783; Davis v. Strong, 
208 Ark. 254, 186 S.W. (2d) 776 (1945); Howard v. Cunningham, 36 Cal. App. 229, 
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from a logic which takes the above statement as one premise and then 
takes as other premises the assumption that monuments are necessarily 
found on the ground, but that courses and distances are necessarily 
found in a deed. 
2. The rules relating to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in 
the construction of ambiguous instruments. It seems to be settled that 
evidence of a survey or acts of the parties in designating boundaries 
is admissible in such cases.4 The commonest ambiguity of this sort is 
that which appears only when an attempt is made to apply the calls 
of a deed to the ground. 5 
3. The admissibility of extrinsic evidence to prove the location of 
monuments called for by a deed. Such evidence is admissible. 6 A 
result of its admission may be to place the call for the monument in 
conflict with a call for course and distance, and a decision may be 
reached by an application of the rule of construction stated in exclusion 
No. I above. 
4. Conveyances of land described "according to government su.r-
vey thereof." Here it is well settled that the monuments indicated by 
the government surveyor for lines or comers of sections or fractions 
thereof will control any inconsistent calls in the field notes or plat 
prepared by the surveyor, and the boundaries so established cannot be 
challenged on the ground that if the surveyor had performed his task 
according to law, such boundaries would have been placed elsewhere.7 
The only way in which this rule can be said to involve the- question 
under discussion is by treating the field notes and plat as incorporated 
171 P. 976 (1918); Hammonds v. Jones, 275 Ky. 788, 122 S.W. (2d) 736 (1938); 
Conner v. Jarrett, 120 W.Va. 633, 200 S.E. 39 (1938). 
4Afbert v. Schenley Auto Sales, Inc., 375 Pa. 512, 100 A. (2d) 605 (1953). 
5 See Waterman v. Johnson, 30 Mass. 261 (1832). 
6 E.g.: Mills v. Lux, 45 Cal. 273 (1873); Mitchell v. Moore, 152 Fla. 843, 13 S. 
(2d) 314 (1943); Robinson v. White, 42 Me. 209 (1856); Holmes v. Barrett, 269 Mass. 
497, 169 N.E. 509 (1929); Lessee of Alshire v. Hulse, 5 Ohio 534 (1832); Clary v. 
McGlynn, 46 Vt. 347 (1874). Cf. Bradshaw v. Booth, 129 Va. 19, 105 S.E. 555 (1921). 
7 Galt v. Willingham, (5th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 757; Galbraith v. Parker, 17 Ariz. 
369, 153 P. 283 (1915); Luther v. Walker, 175 Ark. 846, 1 S.W. (2d) 6 (1927); Chap-
man v. Polack, 70 Cal. 487, 11 P. 764 (1886); Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 S. 
805 (1894); Ogilvie v. Copeland, 145 ill. 98, 33 N.E. 1085 (1893); Rollins v. Davidson, 
84 Iowa 237, 50 N.W. 1061 (1892); Britton v. Ferry, 14 Mich. 53 (1866); O'Neil v. 
Davidson, 147 Minn. 240, 180 N.W. 102 (1920); Woods v. Johnson, 264 Mo. 289, 174 
S.W. 375 (1915); Myrick v. Peet, 56 Mont. 13, 180 P. 574 (1919); Harris v. Harms, 105 
Neb. 375, 181 N.W. 158 (1920); Fellows v. Willett, 98 Okla. 248, 224 P. 298 (1923); 
Schmidtke v. Keller, 44 Ore. 23, 73 P. 332, 74 P. 222 (1903); Randall v. Burk Township, 
4 S.D. 337 (1893); Daniels v. Florida Industrial Co., 159 Va. 472, 166 S.E. 712 (1932). 
In the words of one court, "A survey of public lands does not ascertain boundaries; it 
creates them." Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427 at 436, 43 S.Ct. 154 (1922). 
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into the description contai~ed in the patent, and by treating the survey 
itself as extrinsic. But this is hardly justified if the statutory scheme 
for the surveying and disposition of government lands is to be vindi-
cated, nor in view of the fact that these conveyances are of land 
described according to the government survey. The importance of 
distinguishing the two situations must be emphasized, lest one offer the 
rule as to government-survey boundaries as authority for the main rule 
under discussion. This has happened on occasion, as will be pointed 
out in due course. 
A rule similar to the government-survey rule has been stated by 
some courts in regard to land originally held by a state and patented 
or granted by it, although the reasons for the rule in the one case are 
not necessarily present in the other.8 
5. The problem under discussion is clearly not involved in a sit-
uation which has occasionally arisen, but which cannot be designated 
otherwise than by a statement of its typical facts. Land owned by a 
grantor is surveyed in preparation for a conveyance of all or part thereof, 
but the surveyor mistakenly sets boundaries which include land not 
owned by the grantor and exclude land intended for conveyance. The 
description in the deed is then stated in accordance with the survey. 
Here there is no conflict between description and survey, but both fail 
to include land which the parties believed had been conveyed. In the 
absence of other facts there is no ground for a claim by the grantee that 
the unreformed deed in question conveyed the land unintentionally 
omitted from it.9 
6. That vague and as yet uncharted sea of doctrine which can be 
loosely designated under the head of boundaries by acquiescence. This 
is not to say that a case involving our rule cannot also involve a ques-
tion of acquiescence. Indeed, a large percentage of the cases here con-
sidered were at least potentially acquiescence cases. And whenever an 
acquiescence issue gets into the picture, it is likely to predominate. 
But often it does not get into the picture, perhaps because suit is brought 
before it can. The two problems are alike in that they both involve the 
question whether boundaries can be fixed against the express terms of 
a deed. They are unlike in that the acquiescence problem has to do 
with facts occurring after the conveyance, while in our problem the 
crucial facts occur before the conveyance. 
s See discussion of North Carolina and Pennsylvania cases below. 
9 Jones v. Poundstone, 102 Mo. 240, 14 S.W. 824 (1890); Blassingame v. Davis, 68 
Tex. 595, 5 S.W. 402 (1887). Cf. Watts v. Howard, 77 Tex. 71, 13 S.W. 966 (1890). 
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7. The rule of Lerned v. Morrill.10 If a deed calls for monuments 
which have not been placed on the land at the time of the conveyance, 
but which are later so placed by the parties, the latter will be bound 
thereby, as if the monuments existed at the time of the conveyance.11 
8. Adverse possession. 
One's initial reaction to our rule as stated is likely to be wholly 
unfavorable. Indeed, it is also likely to be one of disbelief that this 
rule could be the law anywhere. It seems desirable that some prelimi-
nary analysis of this reaction be offered by way of further introduction. 
The first basis for indictment of the rule that will occur to one is 
the Parol Evidence Rule. It is difficult to conceive of any principle of 
interpretation which would reconcile these two rules. Indeed, it would 
seem that to do what is sought to be done with our problem would con-
stitute the most flagrant sort of subversion of the integrity of a written 
instrument. Is there not also a question about the rule's consistency 
with the Statute of Frauds? And can it not also be argued that the rule 
is inconsistent with the principle that the preliminary negotiations and 
contracts of the parties to a conveyance are merged in the consummat-
ing deed? Whatever specific theoretical objections are raised, basically 
the question is whether one of the parties to a conveyance will be 
allowed to deny the effect of their solemn and formal act. To the 
extent that the description of the land conveyed is concerned, are the 
parties' acts in surveying or otherwise marking the land upon the ground 
to become the legally operative acts and their deed merely a subordi-
nate record thereof? Is this rule consistent with the modern policy 
which seeks by various rules to make it possible for a purchaser of land 
to rely on the written records of prior transactions? Does not this rule 
in fact amount to a partial revival of the feoffment? 
An answer can be made by way of confession and avoidance that 
the integrity of the Parol Evidence Rule and kindred rules can be pre-
served by applying in this situation the equitable doctrine of reforma-
tion for mutual mistake. It must be apparent that many of the cases 
of this kind which arise could be disposed of on that basis; that is, the 
facts show that the discrepancy between the description and the marked 
boundaries was the result of a mistake in drafting the instrument. Our 
10 2 N.H. 197 (1820). 
11 Knowles v. Toothaker, 58 Me. 172 (1870); Kennebec Purchase v. Tiffany, 1 Me. 
219 (1821); Cleaveland v. Flagg, 58 Mass. 76 (1849). Cf. Oliver v. Muncy, 262 Ky. 
164, 89 S.W. (2d) 617 (1936). Contra, Cripe v. Coates, (Ind. App. 1954) 116 N.E. 
(2d) 642. 
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rule, however, declares that a deed may in effect be reformed in an 
action at law, in ejectrnent, trespass, etc. Now if the only question 
involved were the observance of procedural requirements, there would 
be little ~eason for an article such as this. Or if a court desired to apply 
an equitable doctrine in a legal action, this would be of small interest 
to one primarily concerned with the law of conveyancing. We would 
want to be certain even here that the court and the parties were aware 
of what was going on and that the established requirements for refor-
mation were observed. But what are the chances of ignoring these safe-
guards if a court frames the issue, not in terms of reformation, but in 
terms of construction, and decides the case, under our rule, not on the 
basis of facts which the deed should have contained, but on the basis 
that the deed in fact or in law did contain them? One should want to 
look very closely to see if the marking of boundaries on the ground were 
not the unilateral act of the grantor or, where the boundaries were 
marked by a surveyor on the direction of a grantor, if the grantee ac-
cepted the deed on the b~is thereof. Of gravest import is the status in 
such a situation of a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the land without 
notice of the extrinsic acts of the original parties. Such a purchaser 
will be protected in a suit for reformation. But will his status as a 
bona fide purchaser be relevant in an action where the issue is the 
proper construction of the instrument? The rule as stated takes no 
account of him, either expressly or by implication. 
It was with some such thoughts as these that a search was made of 
the cases to discover where the rule as stated has been adopted, why it 
was adopted, and what qualifications or limitations, if any, have been 
imposed upon it. 
I. THE RuLE IN GENERAL 
This part includes a discussion of the cases for and against the rule 
as defined above and as indicated by the quotation first stated at the 
beginning of this article. These cases are considered separately from 
those which are thought to involve the same basic issues, but which are 
confined to a special factual situation. The latter are discussed in Part II. 
A. Authority for the Rule 
It is possible for the problem to be presented in a surprising variety 
of ways. Usually it will arise in an action at law for the recovery of land 
or for trespass, although it may arise in a suit for specific performance 
of a contract for the sale of land, where the title of the vendor is at 
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stake. The suit may be between the parties to a conveyance or between 
their successors in interest. A successor of either grantor or grantee may 
have taken by gift, descent, or devise, or he may be a purchaser, with 
or without notice of the extrinsic acts of the original parties. By far 
the most common situation will involve grantees of adjacent parcels 
from a common grantor. This typical basic situation may itself be 
subject to numerous variations in terms of the priority in time of the 
two original conveyances and the question as to which of the grantees 
or his successor is suing the other or his successor. Unfortunately the 
cases do not often reveal the variations at this point. Where the rule is 
conceded to be no more than a rule of construction, such variations 
would not be relevant. But they would be relevant to one who is con-
cerned about the status of a subsequent bona fide purchaser without 
notice of marked boundaries. We may be aided at this point by certain 
assumptions which seem justified by the nature of the general circum-
stances. It may be assumed in the first place, where there have been 
conveyances of adjacent land by a common grantor, that the descrip-
tions in the two conveyances conllict, or at least are capable of being 
so construed. It may also be assumed that the question relates to the 
extent of the conveyance which is prior in time; that is, whether its 
descriptive terms or previously marked lines will control. Obviously 
nothing would be gained by an inquiry into any subsequent conB.icting 
conveyance of adjacent land in this regard if the description of the prior 
conveyance were unimpeachable. The prior grantee or his successor 
may be seeking, by application of the rule, to add to his recognized hold-
ings a strip of land at the expense of the subsequent purchaser or his 
successor. Or the subsequent purchaser or his successor may be seeking, 
by application of the rule, to narrow the scope of the prior conveyance 
to his advantage. It may be inferred, however, that the latter of these 
possibilities is not likely to occur, for it is not likely that the subsequent 
purchaser will be in a position to know anything about what transpired 
between the grantor and a prior grantee of other land, except as re-
corded in the instrument. This process of elimination by way of assump-
tions is not intended to suggest that the eliminated possibilities cannot 
or have not occurred in the cases. It is intended merely to suggest that, 
in the absence of reported facts in the cases relevant to this classification, 
the typical and most likely situation will have involved a suit by a prior 
grantee or his successor against a subsequent grantee or his successor, 
the former seeking to gain by resort to lines marked prior to the convey-
ance to him. If this is so, the status of the defendant as a possible bona 
fide purchaser without knowledge of the marked lines certainly seems 
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relevant. It is surprising, therefore, that so few of the cases contain 
any reference to the problem. Where a court regards the rule as one 
of construction only, it is not surprising for such a question to be dis-
missed as irrelevant. But where the question is not even mentioned 
in the court's opinion, it is natural to infer that it was not raised by 
counsel. This in tum implies that the facts may have precluded it, that 
the above assumptions may not be correct, or that the subsequent pur-
chaser in fact may not have been bona fide. But this is not at all con-
clusive. Such an issue may not occur to counsel who is facing the 
assertion by his opponent of a proposition which takes the form of a 
simple rule of construction. It is not likely to occur to him that oppos-
ing counsel is masking what is really a claim for reformation for mutual 
mistake, against which a defense of bona fide purchase would be perti-
nent. It is even more unlikely where the parties are remote grantees 
from a common grantor, for who would believe that his opponent is 
implicitly seeking reformation when the latter is so far removed from 
the instrument to be reformed? 
It is fair to assume, therefore, that the cases about to be discussed, 
most of whose facts are inadequately reported, include some which 
apply the rule against persons who, in equity, ought not to have been 
subjected to it. To this extent, justification for the rule remains to be 
found. Where, however, cases are found which do reveal facts or state-
ments relevant to this question, appropriate mention will be made of 
that fact. 
It seems desirable to present first the origin and development of the 
problem in four states in which it has received the greatest attention. 
For this purpose a roughly chronological presentation of the cases in 
those states is indicated. 
1. The North Carolina Cases 
Person v. Roundtree is the earliest case in point which has been 
found. It is not in fact officially reported, but appears in a note to 
another early case.12 Its date is not indicated, but it must have been 
decided some years before the end of the eighteenth century. Yet it 
has been cited in a number of other cases in North Carolina and else-
where. The briefly stated facts about it raise our problem in a striking 
manner, and have not been exactly repeated in any later case. As the 
result of a mistake either of the surveyor or another official, the land 
described, apparently in a grant by the state, was on the opposite side 
12_ v. Beatty, 2 N.C. 487 (1796). 
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of a creek from and included none of the land surveyed. The grantee, 
however, settled on the land surveyed. The plaintiff claimed the land 
surveyed under a deed from another, and sued in ejectment. Judg-
ment was for the defendant, and the only reported comment was that 
the mistake of the officer who "filled up" the grant should not prejudice 
the defendant. If the facts as stated were clearly proved, the defendant 
would have the strongest kind of claim to relief by way of reformation; 
and if he were in possession when the plaintiff took his deed, which 
seems implied, the latter would have been on notice of his claim. This 
decision, therefore, may offend against nothing save procedural regu-
larity. Three other early cases contain dicta approving the departure 
from a line described to follow a marked line.13 The court in one of 
these14 doubted the vvisdom of departing in the first instance from the 
words of a grant, but said that many decisions of their courts have 
allowed such departures, citing Person v. Roundtree. 
The leading North Carolina case, however is Cherry v. Slade's 
Administrator.15 Although the decision was not in point, the court 
defined by way of dictum, a series of rules governing boundaries, to-
gether with an explanation of the special circumstances existing in the 
state which made such rules necessary. One of the rules was stated to 
be that whenever it can be proved that there was a line actually run by 
the surveyor, which was marked, the party claiming under the patent or 
deed shall hold accordingly, notwithstanding a mistaken description of 
the land in the patent or deed. The extravagance of this statement is 
obvious, since it omits any requirement that the line actually run shall 
be with the knowledge or consent of either party. It may be that the 
court had in mind the same principle that now prevails in the case of 
land described according to government survey; that is, that the acts 
of an official surveyor determine the boundaries.16 The justification 
given by the court for the rules laid down, however, was the physical 
condition of the country, which at that time consisted largely of un-
inhabited, mountainous, and heavily forested land. Under these con-
ditions, the inexact and often unskilled efforts to survey large tracts 
would have resulted, in the court's view, in a chaos of boundaries if the 
courses and distances recited in patents and deeds were relied on. The 
13 Ibid; Loften v. Heath, 3 N.C. 347 (1805); Blount v. Benbury, 3 N.C. 353 (1805). 
14 Loften v. Heath, 3 N.C. 347 (1805). 
15 7 N.C. 82 (1819). 
16 See statement in Den v. Green, 9 N.C. 218 at 224-225 (1822). It is obvious that 
such a principle can be justified only where the land is described according to such survey, 
not where it is described, as in these cases, by metes and bounds. 
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court believed that the only way to keep any semblance of order was 
to assign primary significance to natural boundaries, marked lines, and 
well-established lines and comers of adjoining tracts.17 
A few years later a significant limitation was placed upon the rule of 
the Cherry case in Den v. Green.18 First the court said that Persons v. 
Roundtree could be explained on the ground of an inconsistency be-
tween a call for a marked line or comer and calls for courses and dis-
tances. But it was admitted that, however much lamented, the courts 
of the state had gone further and permitted parol evidence to contradict 
a deed. The court, however, confined this principle to a case where 
the marks of a line or comer remained visible at the time of the trial, 
which was not so in this case. To allow proof of marked lines no longer 
visible "would place the boundaries of our lands at the mercy of per-
jured, ignorant or forgetful men." Two years later this limitation on 
the rule was ignored, and it was left to the jury to decide whether 
marked lines were once located where they were alleged to be.19 The 
limitation on the rule was reasserted in Den v. ShenckJ 20 together with 
the further limitation that old marks on the ground must appear to 
correspond with the date of the deed, and must so nearly correspond 
with course and distance that they may well be supposed to have been 
made for the boundaries described. A still further limitation was im-
posed in the rejection of proof of stakes on the ground, they being· by 
nature too much subject to decomposition to alter the construction of 
the deed. Some years later in Den v. Alexander21 the court appeared 
to repudiate the rule altogether, at least in cases not involving grants 
from the state, and distinguished Person v. Roundtree on that basis.22 
Later Doe v. Perkins23 followed the Shenck case in rejecting proof of 
17 The rule above stated was the second of four laid down by the court. The others 
were: (1) Whenever a natural boundary is called for the line is to determine at it, with-
out regard to inconsistencies with course or distance. (3) Where lines or comers of an 
adjoining tract are called for, the lines shall be extended to them, without regard to 
distance. (4) Failing marked trees or comers, calls for natural boundaries, or calls for 
adjacent tracts, courses and distances may then control, for there is nothing else left to rely 
on. Compare the statement about early conditions in the state in Brown v. House, 116 N.C. 
859 at 864, 21 S.E. 938 (1895). 
1s 9 N.C. 218 at 225 (1822). 
10 McNeill v. Massey, 10 N.C. 91 (1824). 
20 13 N.C. 414 (1830). 
2129 N.C. 237 (1847). 
22 Doe v. Rives, 32 N.C. 256 (1849), two years later, might be regarded as involving 
a conffict between a call for a tree as a monument and calls for course and distance, there 
being no tree found by following course and distance. The jury was instructed that if 
the tree alleged to be the terminus of the line were marked at the time of the original 
survey, it would control. The instruction was approved, and the court cited Den v. Schenck 
and McNeill v. Massey, supra. 
2s 47 N.C. 222 (1855). 
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a stake placed at the time of the survey. The rule of the Cherry case 
was again recognized in Safret v. Hartman,24 but with the essential 
qualification which requires proof that the marked comer must have 
been acted upon in making the deed. The court added, as in Den v. 
Alexander, that the Cherry rule should be confined to patents or grants 
by the state.25 In Graybeal v. Powers26 the court accepted the rule but 
denied its applicability to a case where, as here, a natural boundary is 
called for. An established line of an adjacent tract was held to be a 
natural boundary for this purpose. Presumably this means that proof 
of a marked line can control course or distance, but not a call for a 
natural monument.27 
During the last quarter of the last century there appeared a number 
of other cases which either accepted the rule by way of dictum,28 refused 
to apply the rule because the facts did not justify it,29 or purported to 
apply the rule where in fact the terms of the grant appeared to be 
ambiguous.30 These dicta recognize the limitation not stated in the 
Cherry dictum that the marked lines must have been made or adopted 
by the parties with a view to making the deed or grant confoi:m to them. 
One case states that where a description is so wanting as to vitiate the 
conveyance, the rule cannot be used to supply the want.31 Higdon v. 
Rice32 is significant for a statement which seems to be an effort to jus-
tify the rule: "it is nevertheless competent to correct a mistake in a de-
scription by oral testimony tending to show what the parties consented 
to at the time of executing a deed, for the reason that it is in explana-
tion of what is always so far ambiguous as to require evidence dehors 
the deed to establish it." This must mean that extrinsic evidence is 
always admissible to apply the description to the ground; to show, for 
example, where a monument called for is actually located. If this is 
so, then it follows that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show where 
24 50 N.C. 185 (1857). 
25 Addington v. Jones, 52 N.C. 582 (1860), also recognized the rule in the case of 
a grant, but did not apply it because of insufficiency of proof. 
2s 76 N.C. 66 (1877). 
27 See also Batts v. Staton, 123 N.C. 45, 31 S.E. 372 (1898). 
28Baxter v. Wilson, 95 N.C. 137 at 143 (1886); Cox v. McGowan, II6 N.C. 131 
at 133, 21 S.E. 108 (1895); Shaffer v. Gaynor, ll7 N.C. 15 at 23, 23 S.E. 154 (1895); 
Deaver v. Jones, ll9 N.C. 598, 26 S.E. 156 (1896); Batts v. Staton, 123 N.C. 45 at 48, 
31 S.E. 372 (1898). 
29 The Falls of Neuse Mfg. Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N.C. 485, 11 S.E. 568 (1890); 
Tucker v. Satterthwaite, 123 N.C. 5ll, 31 S.E. 722 (1898); McKenzie v. Houston, 130 
N.C. 566, 41 S.E. 780 (1902). 
so Higdon v. Rice, 119 N.C. 623, 26 S.E. 256 (1896). 
31 The Falls of Neuse Mfg. Co. v. Hendricks, 106 N.C. 485, 11 S.E. 568 (1890). 
s2 ll9 N.C. 623 at 625, 26 S.E. 256 (1896). 
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lines were run, without regard to the description. This argument comes 
close to saying that if extrinsic evidence is admissible for one purpose, 
it is admissible for all purposes. 
In Elliott v. Jefferson33 the rule was squarely applied in the con-
struction of a deed, by way of approval of an instruction given by the 
court below incorporating the rule.34 Two other cases purported to 
follow Elliott v. Jefferson.35 It is interesting that in one of these36 the 
court said that a marked line would control a call for a comer or a line 
of another tract. Such an application of the rule had been previously 
rejected· in Graybeal v. Powers, above. 
The rule was applied in Clarke v. Aldridge, 37 which was a suit in 
partition between the heirs of a grantor, the grantee being made a party-
defendant. Although these facts could not raise the issue of a bona fide 
purchase without notice, the court for the first time recognized the 
relevance of that issue, saying that the rule would apply "certainly 
as between the parties or voluntary claimants who hold in privity .... " 
The court also expressly denied that the rule depended upon any 
written reference in the deed to the survey or markings on the ground. 
The bona fide purchase issue was also recognized in Allison v. Kenion,38 
but the defendant was held to have been on notice of the proper con-
struction of the deed, because of language in the deed which the court 
decided was an adequate reference to a comer established on the 
ground, so that extrinsic evidence was admissible to locate the corner. 
This fact, plus the fact that the corner was marked by the parties after 
the conveyance, 39 is sufficient to remove this case from the compass 
of the rule. But the court nevertheless said that the line of cases stem-
ming from the Cherry case were authority for the decision. More 
appropriately, another ground offered was estoppel based on long ac-
quiescence in the established boundary. 
33 133 N.C. 207, 45 S.E. 558 (1903). 
34 In commenting on the instructions given and those refused, the court reiterated the 
qualification of the Cherry dictum that the marked .line can control only when it can be 
shown to have been the intention of the parties by their deed to describe the line as marked. 
But in Fincannon v. Sudderth, 140 N.C. 246, 52 S.E. 579 (1905), the court quoted the 
original Cherry dictum in a case which, however, involved the admissibility of evidence to 
resolve an ambiguity in the description. In Caldwell Land & Lumber Co. v. Erwin, 150 
N.C. 41, 63 S.E. 356 (1908), the rule was held inapplicable, under the qualification stated 
in the Elliott case, since it was not proved that the line was marked at the time of the grant 
with a view to making it one of the boundaries. 
35 Mitchell v. Welborn, 149 N.C. 347, 63 S.E. 113 (1908); Lance v. Rumbough, 150 
N.C. 19, 63 S.E. 357 (1908). 
36 Mitchell v. Welborn, note 35 supra. 
37 162 N.C. 326 at 330, 78 S.E. 216 (1913). 
38 163 N.C. 582, 79 S.E. 1110 (1913). 
39 Cf. the Lemed v. Morrill situation, discussed at notes 10 and 11 supra. 
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That a marked boundary, to control a written description, must have 
been made before or contemporaneously with the deed, not after, was 
declared in Ritter Lumber Company v. Montvale Lumber Company.40 
Indeed, as before laid down, the court requires that the parties must 
have intended their deed to convey the land as marked by them. Put-
ting it in other words, the court said that the marked lines must be so 
connected with the deed, either by intrinsic or extrinsic evidence, as 
to create a presumption as to the intent of the grantor. By stating the 
rule in this way the court is led into a superficially plausible justifica-
tion for it: the intention of the parties is primary; the words used are 
not the "principal things to be considered"; and so, after all, the rule 
is not intended to allow a violation of the terms of a deed, but is only 
in furtherance of its purposes. 41 There was a lengthy discussion of 
prior cases, and an admission that the rule was adopted with reluctance 
and was sometimes questioned. Proper limits were required, the court 
said, so that the rule would not be pushed beyond its necessary import. 
The evidence in this case failed to meet the particular limitation im-
posed here, and the rule was not applied. The justification offered by 
the court is particularly significant in that it proceeds from an assump-
tion that the rule is only one of construction. Such an assumption is 
inconsistent with the thought that the court in these cases was in effect 
reforming deeds on the ground of mutual mistake. In this view, of 
course, there is no ground for an equitable defense of bona fide pur-
chase without notice of marked lines. 
In a division of land of a decedent it was held that if the commis-
sioners who allotted the shares went upon the land and put up stakes 
marking the lines of each share, these would control the written de-
scription thereof, if the commissioners made a mistake in writing out 
the description.42 The parties to the suit took adjoining lots in this 
division, but nothing is said of their relation to the decedent, or whether 
in fact anyone other than the commissioners was aware of the bounda-
ries they marked.43 
The bona :6.de purchase issue was again raised in Dudley v. 
Jeffress, 44 where tenants in common agreed to partition, and were with 
the surveyor who marked the line, which they both approved. The 
4o 169 N.C. 80, 85 S.E. 438 (1915). 
41 See also similar argument in Elliott v. Jefferson, 133 N.C. 207, 45 S.E. 558 (1903). 
42Lee v. Rowe, 172 N.C. 846, 90 S.E. 222 (1916). 
43 The rule was also applied to the heirs or devisees of adjacent landowners who set-
tled a dispute over their boundary by agreeing on a line and executing quitclaim deeds 
accordingly. Millikin v. Sessoms, 173 N.C. 723, 92 S.E. 359 (1917). 
44 178 N.C. 111, 100 S.E. 253 (1919). 
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plaintiff was a successor through mesne conveyances to one of these 
parties. In applying the rule, the court rejected the argument that the 
plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser by finding that he purchased with 
knowledge of the marked line, and so held "subject to the same estop-
pel." One is brought up short by the court's unobtrusive insertion of 
the word "estoppel." This may have been only a meaningless slip of 
verbiage. Surely the court was not intending to say at this late date that 
its long-reiterated rule was founded on estoppel. It may be significant 
here that to have held otherwise would have allowed the plaintiff to 
take land on which stood certain of the defendant's buildings. Maybe 
the court was taking into account the conduct of the· parties after the 
conveyance, which would be relevant to a question of boundary by 
estoppel or acquiescence, but irrelevant to the rule which it purported 
to be applying. Something of the same thought crept into the next case 
to be decided, S.S.M. Realty Company v. Boren.45 Here it seems clearer 
that the court was blending two rules, the rule under discussion and 
a rule of estoppel ·based on acquiescence, for evidently there were facts 
which raised both issues, although this is not made entirely clear. And 
again, as in Dudley v. Jeffress, estoppel is mentioned in reference to 
the "privies" of the original parties. 
Finally, in Yopp v. Aman,46 a suit by a grantee against his grantor 
to establish a boundary, the defendant raised the issue which should 
have occurred to parties to these suits long ago. He alleged mutual 
mistake, and this issue was squarely presented to the jury. The result 
in effect was reformation. But the court felt impelled to restate the old 
rule, quoting from Clarke v. Aldridge, above. 47 Although there was no 
issue here of bona fide purchase, the latter quotation, it will be recalled, 
,declares the rule to be applicable as between the parties or "voluntary 
daimants who hold in privity." 
In summary, the rule has been recognized in North Carolina 
throughout the entire reported legal history of the state. A single early 
case repudiating the rule has been engulfed and isolated by a long line 
of later cases. But there has been a kind of see-sawing down through 
the years as the court, evidently alarmed by the full implications of 
what it had done, sought from time to time to put some sort of shackles 
on its ill-conceived brain-child. It is not surprising that the court seldom 
undertook to justify the rule except in terms of precedent. The early 
45 211 N.C. 446, 190 S.E. 733 (1937). 
46 212 N.C. 479, 193 S.E. 822 (1937). See Zink v. Davis, (Ore. 1954) 277 P. (2d) 
1007, for a recent case from another state in which the problem was solved by reformation. 
47 162 N.C. 326, 78 S.E. 216 (1913). 
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argument of the Cherry case, resting on the physical circumstances of 
an undeveloped country, has long since lost its force, except perhaps in 
regard to descriptions which may still perpetuate or refer to the descrip-
tions in the early grants. The few other arguments for the rule are 
unconvincing. Of the numerous qualifications which have appeared 
from time to time, the most important was intended to correct the 
sweeping dictum of the Cherry case, and required that the lines on the 
ground must have been made by or with the knowledge of both parties 
to the conveyance, who must further have intended their deed to de-
scribe such lines. Although this qualification may have been ignored 
on one or more occasions, it seems pretty well established. It has also 
been held that (1) the rule applies only to grants from the state, (2) 
the rule applies only where the marked lines remain visible, (3) it does 
not apply where the only markings were made by stakes, ( 4) lines on 
the ground can control calls for courses and distances, but not calls for 
natural boundaries, (5) the rule cannot be used to supply a total want 
of description, and (6) the marks on the ground must so approximate 
the calls of the deed as to raise the inference that the one was intended 
to describe the other. But the first four of these qualifications have been 
ignored in later cases; and the sixth qualification may also have been 
forgotten, for all that appears in the facts of later cases. There has been 
some passing recognition in several of the later cases of the special 
claims of a bona fide purchaser without notice of the boundaries on the 
ground; but no case has been decided in favor of such a purchaser; nor 
is it clear that any case would be so decided, in view of the assumption 
expressed by the court on several occasions that the problem is purely 
one of construction. Apart from this issue, the rule as originally stated 
in this article is firmly established in North Carolina. Whether a vital 
exception will be made in favor of a bona fide purchaser is a question 
upon which no confident prediction can be made at this time. 
2. The Pennsylvania Cases 
The rule in Pennsylvania, as in North Carolina, appeared at an 
early date. The first case, Hall v. Powel,48 concerned the description 
of land in a patent. The boundaries actually surveyed were held to 
control inconsistent boundaries indicated by the return of survey and 
patent. This explanation was given: "The field notes, the original 
plots made by the surveyor, the survey returned, and the patent, are 
48 19 Pa. 456 (1818). 
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only evidence of the survey. The real survey, the primary evidence, 
is the marks on the ground."40 This seems to be the same principle 
which is now applied to land conveyed according to United States gov-
ernment survey, but without the justifying fact, found in cases of the 
latter type, that the patent describes the land according to the survey. 
Whether or not the official nature of the survey in such a case as this 
justifies the rule laid down, a decision reached on such ground is no 
authority for applying the rule to private deeds. Apparently in such 
a patent case only the acts of the surveyor are relevant, not those of the 
patentee, nor even his knowledge of the survey. It is also obvious that 
under such a rule there is no room for argument about the status of a 
subsequent bona £de purchaser from the patentee who relies on the 
patent but not on the survey itself. 50 A few years later it was held in 
Martz v. Hartley51 that where there is a call for an adjoining survey, 
the line must go to such survey without regard to inconsistent lines 
marked on the ground; but this proposition was soon repudiated.52 
Blasdell v. Bissell53 is the leading case in Pennsylvania, for it ex-
tends the rule governing patents to deeds between private parfies, that 
is, to descriptions which do not merely restate descriptions contained 
in previously issued patents. Although the action was in trespass, by 
original grantor against original grantee, the court, speaking through 
Chief Justice Gibson, spoke in sweeping terms of the exact parallel be-
tween the two situations, and with no exceptions indicated. The only 
other justification offered for adopting the rule is sufficiently indicated 
in brief by the statement that "if we suffered ourselves to be governed 
by the compass and by measurement, collisions would be incessant." 
This is pretty much the same excuse as was offered by the North Caro-
lina court, and may have been prompted in both states by the same 
49 Id. at 462. 
5° Cf. statement of Gibson, C.J., in Smith v. Moore, 37 Pa. 348 at 352 (1829). 
5144 Pa. 261 (1835). 
52 Walker v. Smith, 2 Pa. 43 (1845); Hall v. Tanner, 4 Pa. 244 (1846); McGinnis 
v. Porter, 20 Pa. 80 (1852). Hall v. Powel was followed in Heath v. Annstrong, 12 Pa. 
178 (1849); Mills v. Buchanan, 14 Pa. 59 (1850). 
In some cases title to land was claimed on the basis of state-issued warrants and sur-
veys with no patents having been issued, or with patents issued many years after possession 
was taken under the warrants. In conllicts between lines surveyed and returns of survey, 
or between survey on the one hand and return of survey and plat on the other, a series of 
cases declared in favor of the survey. Wharton v. Garvin, 34 Pa. 340 (1859); Quinn v. 
Heart, 43 Pa. 337 (1862); Malone v. Sallada, 48 Pa. 419 (1864); Darrah v. Bryant, 56 
Pa. 69 (1867); Riddlesburg Iron & Coal Co. v. Rogers, 65 Pa. 416 (1870); Pruner v. 
Brisbin, 98 Pa. 202 (1881); Grier v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 128 Pa. 79, 18 A. 480 (1889). 
It would be difficult to hold otherwise where the title of a claimant can be fixed by a 
transaction which has little semblance of a formal conveyance. 
53 6 Pa. 258 at 259 (1847). 
1955] DESCRlPTION v. SURVEY 663 
topographical conditions. The rule of Blasdell 11. Bissell has been fol-
lowed in a line of cases, the last of which came down within the past 
two years.54 In other cases the rule was not applied because of lack of 
proof that the lines found on the ground were ever intended to serve 
as boundaries.55 Thus even in Pennsylvania it is not enough merely 
to prove that a survey was made prior to a conveyance; the survey must 
be linked somehow with the conveyance, although the slender thread 
of the intention of the parties will suffice for this purpose. 
Some of the cases cited as approving Blasdell 11. Bissell deserve spe-
cial comment. Willis 11. Swartz?6 seems to say that a grantor may be 
estopped to assert the description in his deed if he represented to the 
grantee, prior to the conveyance, that the boundary between the lot 
conveyed and the lot retained was to be as he had marked it on the 
ground. It is not clear whether this was offered as a separate ground 
for decision or as an equitable theory in support of the rule favoring 
lines marked on the ground.57 If it is the latter, then estoppel based 
on misrepresentation must be added to reformation based on mutual 
mistake as a possible equitable explanation for decisions which are 
declared in terms of a rule of law. But nowhere else in the Pennsyl-
vania cases does such an argument appear. The bona-fide-purchase 
question was dismissed in Ogden 11. Porterfoeld58 by the astonishing 
proposition that the purchaser could not have been deceived, for he 
was bound to know the law; that is, that a call of the deed might be 
controlled by boundaries on the ground. This of course virtually elimi-
nates the bona-fide-purchase problem altogether, as well as the thought 
that the rule is essentially equitable, and leaves the rule bald and 
54 Dawson v. Mills, 32 Pa. 302 (1858) (acquiescence subsequent to deed also in-
volved); Ogden v. Porterfield, 34 Pa. 191 (1859); Lodge v. Barnett, 46 Pa. 477 (1864); 
Craft v. Yeaney, 66 Pa. 210 (1870); Burkholder v. Markley, 98 Pa. 37 (1881); Medara 
v. Du Bois, 187 Pa. 431, 41 A. 322 (1898); Rook v. Greenewald, 22 Pa. Super. 641 
(1903); Metcalf v. Buck, 36 Pa. Super. 58 (1908); Rozelle v. Lewis, 37 Pa. Super. 563 
(1908); Caputo v. Mariatti, 113 Pa. Super. 314, 173 A. 770 (1934); Ross v. Golden, 344 
Pa. 487, 25 A. (2d) 700 (1942); Albert v. Schenley Auto Sales, Inc., 375 Pa. 512, 100 
A. (2d) 605 (1953). See also Willis v. Swartz, 28 Pa. 413 (1857); Dunlap v. Reardon, 
24 Pa. Super. 35 (1903); Muia v. Herskovitz, 283 Pa. 163, 128 A. 828 (1925). In Morse 
v. Rollins, 121 Pa. 537, 15 A. 645 (1888), there appeared to be a conffict in the description 
between a call for a monument and a call for a distance, but the court stated the rule in its 
usual form. 
55 Rifener v. Bowman, 53 Pa. 313 (1866); Eshleman v. Rankin, 32 Pa. Super. 254 
(1906). 
5628 Pa. 413 (1857). 
57 Estoppel here is based on misrepresentation, and should be compared with the term 
as it appeared in the North Carolina case, Dudley v. Jeffress, 178 N.C. 111, 100 S.E. 253 
(1919). 
58 34 Pa. 191 (1859). 
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relentless in its operation. In Lodge 11. Barnett59 the court made it clear 
that the proof need not be of manifest or visible lines, but might be 
proof of their former existence. In Medara 11. DuBois60 the court 
applied the rule in a specific performance suit to defeat the defense of 
the purchaser that the vendor's title was unmarketable. Here there 
were adjoining lots, each with a house on it, the houses separated by 
a common wall, which in fact was built several inches west of the 
boundary between the lots as described in previous deeds. The court 
below held that the intendment of the contract was that title should 
pass to half of the wall, and since the deed tendered included less than 
that, the vendor could not recover. Perhaps a better ground would have 
been that the house on the vendor's land, according to the boundaries 
stated in the deed, encroached on adjoining property. But this ruling 
was reversed ,on the ground that the party wall was an artificial monu-
ment on the ground, and that when the common owner of the two lots 
originally conveyed them to different persons, the latter took only to the 
center line of the wall, no matter what their deeds may have said. 
Clearly it would be difficult to say in a case like this that the court was 
applying a sort of reformation principle, for the proper parties to such 
a suit were not before the court.61 In Rook 11. Greenewald62 the court 
expressly said that the rule was not based on reformation, and any 
requirement that the evidence be sufficient to justify reformation would 
be error. Merely a preponderance of the evidence, sufficient to satisfy 
the jury that the parties to the deed intended the boundaries to be as 
marked on the ground rather than as described in the deed, is all that 
is required. The court also held, without discussion, against the argu-
ment that the agreement between the parties about lines on the ground 
merged in the deed. Further, an effort was made to justify the rule in 
terms of the existence of a latent ambiguity, which arises not from the 
deed but from collateral matter. Of course, a deed, apparently unam-
biguous, may be rendered ambiguous when an effort is made to apply 
it to the ground; but it is quite another thing to say that parol evidence 
may normally be admitted not merely to resolve but also to create an 
ambiguity. In Rozelle 11. Lewis,63 a suit between the original parties to 
the deed, the court met the argument that the rule violates the Statute 
59 46 Pa. 477 (1864). 
60 187 Pa. 431, 41 A. 322 (1898). 
61 See also Ross v. Golden, 344 Pa. 487, 25 A. (2d) 700 (1942), with similar facts, 
except that the suit was in ejectment, between the owners of adjoining lots. 
6222 Pa. Super. 641 (1903). 
63 37 Pa. Super. 563 (1908). 
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of Frauds by saying that it was the deed which passed the title and that 
no estate was created or conveyed by parol, any more than in the case 
of a "consentible line," established by the parties after the deed. The 
most recent case, Albert v. Schenley,64 was a suit for damages by a 
vendor for breach of contract for the sale of land. The contract called 
for a lot 146 feet "more or less" in depth, but the deed described the 
property as extending only l 09 feet on one side and I 07 feet on the 
other. The purchaser refused to accept the deed, but the plaintiff was 
allowed to recover on proof that he had pointed out the property de-
scribed by the deed, and monuments marking it, prior to the contract. 
The court stated the rule and added: "Especially is this so where a 
purchaser inspects the property and has an opportunity to see the physi-
cal boundaries." The purchaser here of course was the original pur-
chaser, not a subsequent purchaser from one of the original parties; and 
so this statement can mean no more than that, for the rule to apply, 
both parties to the deed (or contract) must consent to or know of the 
line on the ground. 
Pennsylvania, more clearly than North Carolina, has been com-
mitted to the rule as originally stated. The only qualification imposed 
is the obvious one that the boundaries must have been placed on the 
ground as the work of both parties to the conveyance, and the deed 
must have been intended to describe them, although it may be doubted 
whether this qualification has been strictly adhered to on all occasions. 
The rule is one of construction, with little thought of any equitable 
foundations. And there seems to be little hope for one who would 
claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice of lines on the ground. 
3. The Tennessee Cases 
An early case65 recognized the North Carolina case, Person v. 
Roundtree, 66 as authority where the question raised was whether testi-
mony could be used to vary the description in a grant from the state 
by showing that the original grantee intended to run the boundaries in 
a different manner and had assumed that the survey described in the 
grant had been so run. The court said that the jury could correct such 
a mistake if, as in the Person case, the grantee had taken possession of 
the land according to his claim so as to give notice thereof to subse-
quent purchasers; but that they could not do so to the prejudice of 
64 375 Pa. 512, 100 A. (2d) 605 (1953). 
65 Miller's Lessee v. Holt, 1 Tenn. 110 (1805). 
66 Reported in note to - v. Beatty, 2 N.C. 487 (1796), discussed at note 12 supra. 
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subsequent claimants who had no other notice of the manner in which 
the lines were run than what the register's books would afford. This 
was getting off to a somewhat better start with the rule than in North 
Carolina or Pennsylvania, at least in regard to the claims of subsequent 
purchasers. But it will also be noted that the testimony varying the 
grant, which would be admissible against any but a bona :fide purchaser, 
was merely of a contrary intention of the grantee, not of inconsistent 
acts on the ground. It is doubtful that so liberal an application of the 
rule is sustained by later cases. 
A line of later cases applied67 or approved by dicta68 the proposition 
that in a grant from the state the survey of the land granted controls 
the calls of the grant, or a plat accompanying it. 69 Nothing more was 
said about bona :fide purchasers, but apparently none were involved, 
although the relation of the parties is not entirely clear in several of 
these cases. Person 11. Roundtree was cited as authority, and little other 
authority or justification for the rule appears. Apparently proof of the 
survey did not need to include proof of continuing or visible marks on 
the ground.70 As previously stated, special justification may be offered 
for such a rule, to the extent that it is applied to grants from the state, 
which serves at the same time as a limiting factor, not present in private 
conveyances, and therefore excluding one type of case as authority for 
the other. 
But at an early date the same principle was applied to an ordinary 
conveyance in Hale 11. Darter.71 In justification the court said, "The 
purchaser cannot be concluded by any technical rule of law from show-
ing the land he actually bought and had surveyed to him, although, by 
an error or oversight in drawing his deed, there may be some conBict 
between the courses and distances called for, and those actually run and 
marked at the time of the survey."72 The plaintiff won in ejectment 
on this basis, but the nature of the defendant's claim is not indicated, 
nor whether he might have qualified as a claimant without notice of 
the survey. The bona-fide-purchase issue seems implicit in the facts of 
Dyer 11. Yates,73 where the same result was reached. A grant of land 
67 M'Naiiy v. Hightour, 2 Tenn. 302 (1814); Gamer & Dickson v. Norris' Lessee, 9 
Tenn. 62 (1821); Smith v. Jones, 35 Tenn. 533 (1856). Cf. Martin v. Nance, 40 Tenn. 
648 (1859) (involving a river boundary). 
68 Nolen v. Wilson, 37 Tenn. 332 at 337 (1858); Disney v. Coal Creek Mining & 
Mfg. Co., 79 Tenn. 607 at 612 (1883). 
69 Tate v. Gray's Lessee, 31 Tenn. 73 (1851). 
70 Gamer & Dickson v. Norris' Lessee, 9 Tenn. 62 (1821). 
1129 Tenn. 91 (1849). 
72Jd. at 94. 
7341 Tenn. 135 (1860). 
1955] DESCRIPTION v. SURVEY 667 
omitted a parcel actually surveyed. The grantee died, and the same 
land was sold by his executor at public sale, the same description being 
used. Then the executor sold the omitted parcel to the plaintiff. The 
defendant won in trespass. There was testimony that at the public sale 
the executor expressed his intention to sell only what the deed described, 
but there was other testimony to the contrary, and the jury found for 
the defendant on this issue. The court said there was no doubt that 
the executor intended to limit the amount sold, but that if in fact the 
entire tract was "sold" to the defendant, the executor's ex parte inten-
tion would not restrict the purchase unless a new boundary had been 
fixed by the conveyance. Nothing was said about the plaintiff's notice 
of the original survey or of the import of the public sale, presumably 
because the question was not raised. Maybe this case means merely 
that the rule about grants from the state applies to all who purchase 
the same land from the grantee by way of the same description. If so, 
it might be easier to say that the bona-fide-purchase issue was irrelevant, 
at least if the application of the rule in such a case is justified by the 
special machinery involved in placing state land in private ownership, 
to which the usual rules of conveyancing are not always applicable. 
The latest case, Staub 11. Hampton,74 involved similar facts, except 
that none of the deeds incorporated the description of any original grant 
from the state. The parties took deeds from a common grantor, the 
defendant's junior deed clearly including the land in dispute; and the 
question was whether the plaintiff's prior deed also described that land. 
The plaintiff won in ejectment on the ground that it did. There was 
proof of lines marked on the ground consistent with the plaintiff's 
claim. His difficulty was to establish the beginning point of his descrip-
tion, which was called to be in the line of an adjacent tract. That line, 
however, in fact was located considerably north of where the parties 
thought it was. The court said that the plaintiff's deed was ambiguous, 
which may be doubted; but the decision was placed in part on this 
ground. The court went on, however, to say that the rule applied here, 
and undertook to explain and justify it more fully than in any other 
case which has been found. The rule was justified by way of quota-
tion from two Pennsylvania cases75 to the effect that the physical de-
marcation of boundaries is always the primary fact in the designation 
of land conveyed, the deed merely a representation or copy thereof; 
74117 Tenn. 706, 101 S.W. 776 (1906). 
75 Ogden v. Porterfield, 34 Pa. 191 at 195 (1859); Smith v. Moore, 37 Pa. 348 at 
352 (1829). 
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the one a reliable measure of intention, the other less so. For once the 
normal arguments against the rule were made, and the court undertook 
to answer them. There was no violation of the registration laws, it was 
said, for those laws were not involved. Why they were not involved 
was not explained. The Statute of Frauds was also dismissed, also 
without specific reasons other than the apparent assumption that this 
was not a question of adding to the deed but simply of construing it. 
The same argument presumably would be applicable to dispose of th~ 
Parol Evidence Rule, which in fact was not mentioned as such. The 
court did say that it was not necessary to proceed in equity to reform 
the deed, for the rule applied was an old one which had in effect become 
a rule of property. If the rule is one of property, how pertinent would 
be the claims of a bona fide purchaser? That question was specifically 
raised, but easily resolved here by the :finding that the defendant had 
notice of the plaintiff's claim through the possession of the plaintiff's 
tenant at the time the defendant purchased. 
On the basis of the above-mentioned cases, the rule is well estab-
lished in Tennessee, and without regard for the requirements of refor-
mation for mutual mistake. It is not clear that protection will be re-
served for a bona :fide purchaser, but it is clear at least that the court is 
aware of that problem, and nothing has been found in the cases defi-
nitely inconsistent with such a qualification of the rule. 
Suppose a defendant in ejectment relies on his possession and proof 
that title is not in the plaintiff. The plaintiff relies on a conveyance 
to him which purports to cover the land in question, but the defendant 
seeks to prove that the calls of the conveyance are inconsistent with 
boundaries. marked on the ground. Can he make such a defense? Do 
the arguments for or against the rule apply here? If reformation were 
accepted as a foundation for the rule, can the defendant seek such relief 
where he is neither party nor privy to the mutual mistake? If the rule 
is offered apart from any right to reformation, does the Parol Evidence 
Rule bar the defendant's proof where he is a stranger to the convey-
ance?76 A couple of Tennessee cases seemed to involve such a situa-
tion. 77 The rule was either applied or recognized, but without recog-
nition of the special circumstances. No clear solution to this unusual 
aspect of the problem appears, and no effort will be made here to sug-
gest one, for it reaches the outermost limits of all relevant doctrines, 
76 9 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2446 (1940). 
77 Garner & Dickson v. Norris' Lessee, 9 Tenn. 62 (1821); Martin v. Nance, 40 Tenn. 
648 (1859). 
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where differing views may reasonably be defended. It may be sug-
gested, however, that if the plaintiff could prove that he took without 
notice of the extrinsic marking of boundaries, he should be protected 
in his reliance on the written record of his title. The problem is simi-
larly perplexing if, in such a situation, it is the defendant who relies 
on the description in the plaintiff's chain of title, and the plaintiff who 
seeks to prove inconsistent markings on the ground. 78 
4. The Kentucky Cases 
It may be misleading to present the Kentucky cases at this place, 
for some doubt is raised by the most recent cases as to the status of the 
rule in that state. It is clear enough from the early cases that the rule 
was established and adhered to for over a century. It was applied both 
to patents70 and to private deeds;80 and was approved by dicta in other 
cases.81 No exceptions or qualifications of any sort are mentioned, and 
both patents and deeds are regarded as within the compass of the same 
rule. Although little explanation is given for the rule, and no cases 
from other jurisdictions are cited, the date of the earliest case and the 
brief statement about the rule in that case82 leave little doubt that it 
was produced by the same kind of circumstances mentioned by the 
courts in the states whose cases are discussed above.83 
Several of the cases cited should be separately mentioned. In 
Cowen v. Fauntleroy84 the effect of the proof of marked lines was to 
alter only the course of one call in the patent. In meeting the argument 
78 Cf. Smith v. Jones, 35 Tenn. 533 (1856), where the plaintiff claimed under an 
entry and grant from the state, and the question was whether there was any vacancy left 
by prior grants. This of course depended on the extent of the prior grants, and in this 
regard the court held that if, as actually surveyed, there was a vacancy left by prior grants, 
the calls of such grants would have to give way. 
70 Cowen v. Fauntleroy, 5 Ky. 261 (1810); Preston's Heirs v. Bowmar, 5 Ky. 493 
(1811); Thornberry v. Churchill, 20 Ky. 29 (1826); Reid v. Langford, 26 Ky. 420 (1830); 
Buford v. Cox, 28 Ky. 582 (1831); Kant v. Rice, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1365, 55 S.W. 203 
(1900). Cf. Dimmitt v. Lashbrook, 32 Ky. 1 (1834). 
80 Lyon v. Ross, 4 Ky. 466 (1809); Young v. Leiper, 7 Ky. 503 (1817); Curtis v. 
Kinkead's Executrix, 2 Ky. L. Rep. 60 (1880); Willoughby v. Willoughby, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 
1061, 48 s.w. 427 (1898). 
81 Morriso v. Coghill's Legatees, 2 Ky. 322 at 324 (1804) (patent); Finley v. Mead-
ows, 134 Ky. 70 at 76, 119 S.W. 216 (1909) (patent); Johnson v. Harris, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
449 at 451, 68 S.W. 844 (1902) (deed); McCormick v. Applegate, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 914 
at 512, 76 S.W. 511 (1903) (deed); Profit v. Wentworth Oil Co., 206 Ky. 784 at 786, 
268 S.W. 549 (1925) (deed). 
82 Morriso v. Coghill's Legatees, 2 Ky. 322 at 324 (1804). 
83Jn Holmes v. Trout, 32 U.S. 171 at 177 (1833), concerning Kentucky land, the 
court said: ''Entries were made at an early day, by individuals who were more acquainted 
with the stratagems of savage warfare than the precision of language." 
84 5 Ky. 261 (1810). 
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that this amounted to contradicting the record by parol proof, the court 
offered this ingenious argument: 
"This would be true, if where a line is described by its course 
only, a mathematical line in the cause, either according to the true 
meridian or the magnetic variation were intended; but it is appre-
hended that this is a misconception of the true meaning of such a 
description of boundary. Such a line was never run in making 
any survey, and is impossible to be ascertained with perfect pre-
cision and certainty by any human means. It seems more rational 
to presume the description of a line by its course to be applicable 
to the line as actually run and marked by the surveyor. . . . With 
this consideration, no rule of evidence will be violated in the 
admission of proof to show the line as actually run and marked by 
the surveyor, though it should deviate in some measure from a 
direct mathematical line."85 
Whether or not one accepts this argument as justifying the rule in 
such a situation, at least one can appreciate the difficulty facing a court 
in Kentucky in the year 1810 when the calls of the patent were for 
courses and distances only, without any calls for monuments. Simi-
larly, in Willoughby v. Willoughby86 the court held that, where a 
deed called for a course from one monument to another, presumab]y 
in a straight line, it could be proved that the line actually run deviated 
somewhat from a straight line. These cases of course do not mean that 
the rule in Kentucky was confined to questions about the courses of 
boundary lines as distinguished from other items of description. 
Turning to the more recent cases, Fordson Coal Company v. Pot-
ter's Executors81 apparently was a suit to reform the calls of a deed 
according to the lines surveyed. The court declined to grant such relief 
against bona fide purchasers from the grantee without notice of such 
survey. Since such a result is inescapable in any proceeding upon 
equitable principles, one may wonder whether the plaintiff mistook 
his remedy. The court has never specifically declared that the rule 
adopted in the earlier cases could be applied against such a bona fide 
purchaser, but if the rule was laid down, as it appears to have been, 
as a rule of construction, it is easy to deny the relevance of the bona-
fide-purchase issue. This case at least demonstrates the incongruity 
produced by the rule as it is applied in a state like Pennsylvania, which 
denies any special protection to such a purchaser. Presumably in that 
85 Id. at 261-262. Cf. Dimmitt v. Lashbrook, 32 Ky. 1 at 2 (1834). 
86 20 Ky. L. Rep, 1061, 48 S.W. 427 (1898). 
87 237 Ky. 311, 35 S.W. (2d) 298 (1931). 
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state, assuming that the usual equitable principles are applicable in 
reformation suits, two suits with identical facts could reach opposite 
conclusions of substantive law, depending on the form in which the 
plaintiff states his cause of action. 
In Lawrence v. Wheeler88 a deed called for a stake on a certain 
quarter section line, ''being a stake established by the said Henley and 
A. D. Wheeler .... " The plaintiff in ejectment sought to prove that 
the stake actually had been set a few feet west of the quarter section 
line. But the court held for the defendant saying, "The Andrus deed 
calls for a stake on the quarter section line, therefore, the deed con-
veyed no land west of that line, although Wheeler and Henley may 
have placed a stake at some other point:" This is a square, although 
not an express, rejection of the rule. It is all the more striking because 
of the statement in the deed that the stake had been "established" by 
the parties mentioned, which would be sufficient to cause some courts 
to say that the deed called for the stake as established and that to 6.x the 
corner as it was in fact established would not be to vary the terms of the 
deed.80 This court did not refer to any of the prior decisions applying 
therule.00 
5. Cases in Other Jurisdictions 
(a) In general. The rule was applied in several early cases in 
New Jersey91 and Virginia.92 The justification offered by the New 
Jersey court for the rule was substantially the same as that expressed 
by the North Carolina and other courts whose decisions have been 
previously discussed. Two intermediate court decisions from Cali-
fornia93 and one from New York,84 as well as single decisions by the 
Maine95 and South Carolina courts,96 seem to go on the same basis; 
but the special facts involved or the failure of the courts to explain 
themselves sufficiently leaves some doubt about the commitment of 
these courts to the rule. Dicta from a number of other states support 
ss285 Ky. 288 at 289, 147 S.W. (2d) 698 (1941). 
89 Cf. Allison v. Kenion, 163 N.C. 582, 79 S.E. 1110 (1913); Nivin v. Stevens, 5 
Har. 272 (Del. Super. 1850), both discussed at notes 107 and 108 infra. 
90 See also Daniels v. Davis, 311 Ky. 293, 223 S.W. (2d) 998 (1949), involving a 
conflict between a map referred to in the deed and the survey on which it was based. 
91 Opdyke v. Stephens, 28 N.J.L. 83 (1859). 
92 Baker v. Seekright, 11 Va. 177 (1806); Dogan v. Seekright, 14 Va. 125 (1809). 
See also Herbert v. Wise, 7 Va. 239 at 242 (1802). 
93 Nebel v. Guyer, 99 Cal. App. (2d) 30, 221 P. (2d) 337 (1950); Beall v. Weir, 
11 Cal. App. 364, 105 P. 133 (1909). 
94 Whan v. Steingotter, 54 App. Div. 83, 66 N.Y.S. 289 (1900). 
95 Emery v. Fowler, 38 Me. 99 (1854). 
on Altman v. McBride, 4 Stroh. (S.C.) 208 (1850). 
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the rule. 97 It should be noted, however, that of the cases cited, all are 
inconsistent with other decisions or dicta within the same respective 
. states,98 except the dicta from New Hampshire, South Carolina, and 
Washington. The fact that a single dictum is the sole authority for the 
rule in the several states mentioned leaves some doubt about the weight 
to be given to such dicta. It may be noted, on the other hand, that one 
of the California appellate court decisions referred to99 is the latest 
expression by a California court on the subject. 
The Illinois and Washington dicta are put in evidentiary terms; 
that is, the marks or monuments on the ground are "the most satis-
factory evidence of the place where the true lines were located,"100 
or the line established on the ground by the parties is presumably the 
line mentioned in the deed.101 Does this mean that lines on the ground 
will prevail over lines described in the deed? It does at least in the 
Illinois case, for the court expressly said so. In that case there was an 
ambiguity in the instrument; so the evidence of lines on the ground 
was admissible without regard to the rule. It is easy to spot the error 
lying behind the court's statement of the rule, for the cases cited in 
support of its dictum were either cases declaring the familiar proposi-
tion that calls for monuments control calls for courses and distances, 
or were cases involving government survey boundaries, in which the 
marked boundaries of any government survey subdivision control in 
conveyances based on such survey.102 
The Ohio court in Lessee of Nash v. Atherton103 rejected the rule 
as one of general application, but said it would be applicable in certain 
situations. Such would be where a call were to run a particular course, 
and there were a marked line of the same general course, although not 
exactly the same;104 or where a call were to run a particular course from 
one natural object to another, the course run between these two objects 
97Riley v. Griffin, 16 Ga. 141 at 148 (1854); Fisher v. Bennehoff, 121 ill. 426 at 
433, 13 N.E. 150 (1887); Cornell v. Jackson, 50 Mass. 150 at 154 (1845); Heywood v. 
Wild River Lumber Co., 70 N.H. 24 at 31, 47 A. 294 (1899); Newton v. McKee!, 142 
Ore. 674 at 681, 21 P. (2d) 206 (1933); Bradford v. Pitts, 2 Mill (S.C.) 115 at 118 
(1818); Martin v. Hobbs, (Wash. 1954) 270 P. (2d) 1067 at 1068 (see discussion of 
other Washington cases at note 130 :infra); Gwynn v. Schwartz, 32 W.Va. 487 at 496, 9 
S.E. 880 (1889); Adams v. Alkire, 20 W.Va. 480 at 486 (1882). 
98 See cases cited note 136 infra. 
00 Nebel v. Guyer, 99 Cal. App. (2d) 30, 221 P. (2d) 337 (1950). 
lOOFisher v. Bennehoff, 121 ill. 426 at 433, 13 N.E. 150 (1887). 
101 Martin v. Hobbs, (Wash. 1954) 270 P. (2d) 1067 at 1068. 
102 See exclusions No. 1 and 4, pp. 648 and 649 supra. 
103 10 Ohio 163 (1840). Cf. McAfferty v. Conover's Lessee, 7 Ohio St. 99 (1857). 
104 Cf. Den v. Shenck, 13 N.C. 414 (1830); Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Peytona 
Cannel Coal Co., 8 W.Va. 406 at 416 (1875) •. 
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would be the true course, whatever might be the course called for.105 
Similar distinctions were drawn by the West Virginia court, which 
stated, among other things, that proof of marked lines could control 
calls merely for courses and distances, but not calls for monuments.106 
As stated in the introduction, it is generally conceded that extrinsic 
evidence of a marked line is admissible to resolve an ambiguity or an 
inconsistency between the calls of an instrument. It might be expected 
that some courts, which in certain situations were especially impressed 
by proof of boundaries run on the ground, but were at the same time 
unwilling to violate the integrity of the written record of the conveyance, 
would strain the instrument in search of an ambiguity, so that extrinsic 
proof could be admitted. In Allison 11. Kenion,101 a North Carolina 
case previously referred to, the court held a reference in a deed to the 
"established" northwest corner of the land in question was sufficient to 
allow proof of where the corner had in fact been established, although 
this would reach a point inconsistent with the distances called for. 
Several other courts have gone even farther in this direction. In Nivin 
11. Stevens1°8 a reference in a deed of a city lot to buildings thereon was 
allowed to fix a boundary according to the lines of a building, where 
otherwise the line of the lot would have run through a part of the 
building. In Miles 11. Barrows1°9 the habendum of a deed provided 
that the grantee agreed to put up and maintain fences where the prem-
ises adjoined other land owned by the grantors. It was not clear whether 
the grantee erected the fences before or after the deed, but the court 
allowed the line of a fence to govern the line called for by the deed. 
The court said this did not violate the Parol Evidence Rule, for there 
was an ambiguity in the deed, since the reference to the fences must 
be regarded as calling for the fences as monuments. In Smith 11. Neg-
bauer110 the plaintiff sued for breach of covenant in a deed which 
described a lot as being eighty feet in length, on the ground that the 
lot in fact extended only 65 feet. Recovery was denied on the ground 
that the deed referred to the premises as consisting of a row of houses 
and the lot on which they stood. Since a house and lot ordinarily 
imports a house with a curtilage, shut off from neighboring grounds 
by some physical objects, it was implied that the land was enclosed 
105 Cf. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1061, 48 S.W. 427 (1898). 
10s Winding Gulf Colliery Co. v. Campbell, 72 W.Va. 449 at 466, 78 S.E. 384 
(1913). Cf. Graybeal v. Powers, 76 N.C. 66 (1877). 
101163 N.C. 582, 79 S.E. 1110 (1913). 
108 5 Har. 272 (Del. Super. 1850). 
100 122 Mass. 579 (1877). 
110 42 N.J.L. 305 (1880). 
674 MrcHIGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
within physical boundaries. This was taken to be an equivalent of 
calling for a fence as a boundary.111 
(b) Practical location by common grantor-sub-rule A. Refer-
ence should be made at this point to a group of comparatively recent 
cases which stand as authority for the rule, but which, as indicated 
below, state the rule in somewhat different terms from those originally 
expressed herein. For the convenience of this discussion the rule in this 
context will be referred to as sub-rule A. 
In Herse v. Mazza112 a New York court decided a boundary dispute 
between the grantees of two lots from a common grantor on the basis 
of a line marked on the ground prior to the deeds by the grantor, of 
which both grantees had knowledge when they purchased. Apparently 
the plat which was alleged to show a different line was ambiguous, a 
fact which should have justified a reference to the practical location. 
But the court placed its decision on another ground, saying: 
"The line established in that manner is presumably the line 
mentioned in the deed and no lapse of time is necessary to estab-
lish such location. The location does not rest upon acquiescence 
in an erroneous boundary but upon the fact that the true location 
was made and the conveyance.made in reference to it."113 
This is substantially a statement of the main rule: when a boundary 
is marked on the ground and the conveyance is intended to describe 
that boundary, the deed will be held to have that effect, whether or not 
its terms in fact so provide. The court does not indicate what would 
be done if one grantee had taken with reference to or with knowledge 
of the marked line but the other had not. The proposition does seem 
to be stated, not as a rule of equity, but as one of construction. This 
case has had little effect on later New York decisions. One lower 
court114 reformed a deed on the ground of mutual mistake where the 
facts were similar, and added that the establishment of the line on the 
ground plus undisturbed possession by the grantee for twenty years 
made the marked line controlling even if erroneous, citing Herse v. 
Mazza. This amounts to treating the earlier case merely as authority 
for establishing a boundary by acquiescence. Indeed, under the above-
111 The court cited Opdyke v. Stephens, 28 N.J.L. 83 (1859). Cf. Kanne v. Otty, 25 
Ore. 531, 36 P. 537 (1894), where the court said there was a latent ambiguity if the line 
described in a patent was not surveyed on the line there indicated. 
112 100 App. Div. 59, 91 N.Y.S. 778 (1904). 
11a Id. at 63; 
114 Myer v. Idlewood Association, 146 N.Y.S. 469 (1914). 
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quoted proposition, the line on the ground could not be treated as 
"erroneous."116 
From the variety of doctrine emerging from the lower and inter-
mediate courts of New York, it is not unusual to £nd cases which exert 
a greater influence beyond the borders of that state than within them. 
In Maes v. Olmsted116 the Michigan court followed Herse v. Mazza 
in preferring a boundary marked in the course of a survey over that 
indicated by the plat on the basis of which adjoining lots had been 
sold. The parties in ejectment were successors in interest of the grantees 
of adjacent lots. It is interesting to note that the court found it impos-
sible to reach its decision on the basis of adverse possession because of 
the peculiar tacking rule which at one time prevailed in that state.117 
Also the decision could not be based on the rule of boundaries by 
acquiescence because the defendant's predecessors knew nothing of 
the marked line. But the defendant himself did know of it, and this 
was enough to invoke the rule against him. It was also a fact that the 
plaintiff's predecessor had purchased after the line had been pointed 
out to him, and he had built a fence thereon. The court said that its 
decision ·was based on a special kind of acquiescence arising out of the 
practical location of a boundary line by a common grantor.118 
Maes v. Olmsted was relied on by the Wisconsin court in the most 
recent case on this subject, Thiel v. Damrau,119 in which the same 
result was reached. The court also quoted at length from Herse v. 
Mazza. The rule as stated by this court requires not only the estab-
lishment of the line by a common grantor but also that the respective 
grantees shall have purchased with reference to it. Although the parties 
here were found to have so purchased, the court said that all persons 
claiming under such grantees would also be bound, without stating the 
relevance of the question whether such subsequent purchasers had 
notice of the line previously established. 
The Idaho court in Taylor 11. Reising120 reached a similar result in 
115 Muir v. Palmater, 125 Misc. 793, 211 N.Y.S. 710 (1925), alfd. 216 App. Div. 
734, 214 N.Y.S. 886 (1926), also cited Herse v. Mazza for a decision preferring a marked 
boundary, but without further indication of the exact basis for the decision. 
110 247 Mich. 180, 225 N.W. 583 (1929). 
117 See Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N.W. 169, 46 A.L.R. 788 (1927). 
But see Gregory v. Thorrez, 277 Mich. 197, 269 N.W. 142 (1936). 
118 The court's source for this proposition was 9 C.J. 244 (1916), which cited Herse 
v. Mazza therefor. The latter case did not assert its rule in quite such terms, although it 
was a fact that the line there had been fixed by a common grantor. Most of the cases in 
which the question arises are cases of claimants under a common grantor. 
110 (Wis. 1954) 66 N.W. (2d) 747. 
120 13 Idaho 226, 89 P. 943 (1907). 
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respect to a series of conveyances which described the land according 
to government survey. Although the boundaries might have been held 
to be established by acquiescence, the court specifically used equitable 
estoppel as the main ground for its decision, which may be a different 
way of saying the same thing. In addition the court quoted the unsup-
ported statement by the author of an early treatise on boundaries121 
that where the parties have purchased from a common vendor who 
previously had run a line between their parcels, such iine will be 
regarded as the boundary between them. Later the court in 
Schmidt v. Williams122 approved the rule of Herse v. Mazza, and also 
cited Taylor v. Reising as authority to the same effect. To apply such 
a rule, however, the court said that a tract must have been sold by the 
seller according to the marked boundary, and also so purchased by the 
buyer. In two recent cases the Idaho court cited Taylor v. Reising as 
authority for boundaries by acquiescence, which was the principle 
relied on by the court in both cases.123 In one of these, Campbell v. 
W eishrod, 124 it was indicated that a period of five years is all that is 
required for acquiescence in that state. In the same case the court 
added that where seller and buyer go on the land and mark a boundary, 
the line thus fixed controls the courses and distances contained in the 
deed, citing two North Carolina cases previously discussed.125 It is not 
clear, however, whether the court regarded this statement of the main 
rule as applicable without subsequent acquiescence in the line so fixed. 
It is significant that the plaintiff, who was claiming under an original 
grantee, and who asserted the boundary as described in the deed, was 
found to have purchased with notice of the marked line. The doubt 
about the extent of the Idaho rule was not resolved in the latest case, 
Paurley v. Harris.126 There proof of the marking of a boundary and 
the knowledge thereof by both grantees of adjacent land was excluded 
by the trial court on the ground that it was matter which merged in the 
deed. This ruling was reversed on the ground that the defendant's 
pleading raised the issues of fraud and mistake, to which such evidence 
was relevant. The problem would have been simplified considerably if 
the court had stopped here; but it went on to quote the main rule as 
121 TYLER, BOUNDARIES AND FENCBS 335 (1874). 
122 34 Idaho 723, 203 P. 1075 (1921). 
123 Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 245 P. (2d) 1052 (1952); Mulder v. 
Stands, 71 Idaho 22, 225 P. (2d) 463 (1950). 
124 73 Idaho 82, 245 P. (2d) 1052 (1952). 
125 Millikin v. Sessoms, 173 N.C. 723, 92 S.E. 359 (1917); S.S.M. Realty Co. v. 
Boren, 211 N.C. 446, 190 S.E. 733 (1937). 
12s (Idaho 1954) 268 P. (2d) 351. 
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stated in Campbell v. Weisbrod, qualifying it, however, by a reference 
to acquiescence in the marked line "for a considerable period of time." 
Further confusion appears from the fact that acquiescence here had 
not continued for the five-year period. Beckwith, J., dissenting, ob-
jected to reducing the period for acquiescence below five years. He 
added that Campbell v. Weisbrod stood for· the determination of a 
boundary on the basis of its practical location alone, but that this was 
an error which had been later corrected.127 It would be difficult to say 
at this time whether the rule in any form exists in Idaho apart from a 
requirement of subsequent acquiescence in a marked boundary for some 
period of time. 
Similarly, Herse v. Mazza was quoted approvingly in two Okla-
homa cases,128 but there is some indication that a boundary fixed by a 
common grantor will be binding only where it is later acquiesced in by 
the parties, although not necessarily for the full statutory period.129 
A line of Washington cases applies the rule in terms of the fixing 
of a line by a common grantor,130 although Herse v. Mazza is ap-
parently not the direct source thereof.131 The first case132 to apply the 
rule relied on a Tennessee case.133 This case might also have been 
justified on the basis of a proper construction of the deed in question. 
It seems clear from these cases that the grantees must have purchased 
with reference to the line fixed by the common grantor or ·with notice 
of it. Again there are some references to subsequent acquiescence in 
127 Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359, 262 P. (2d) 1006 (1953), an adverse pos-
session case, in which the court also held that a boundary might be established by acquies-
cence for the full statutory period. 
128 Lake v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950); Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 
Okla. 465, 45 P. (2d) 518 (1935). 
129 Cf. Reynolds v. Wall, 181 Okla. 110 at 112, 72 P. (2d) 505, 113 A.L.R. 417 
(1938). 
130 Atwell v. Olson, 30 Wash. (2d) 179, 190 P. (2d) 783 (1948); Strom v. Arcorace, 
27 Wash. (2d) 478, 178 P. (2d) 959 (1947); Windsor v. Bourcier, 21 Wash. (2d) 313, 
150 P. (2d) 717 (1944); Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P. 1031, 136 P. 1146 (1913); 
Windsor v. Sarsfield, 66 Wash. 576, 119 P. 1112 (1912); Campbell v. Seattle, 59 
Wash. 612, 110 P. 546 (1910); Turner v. Creech, 58 Wash. 439, 108 P. 1084 (1910). 
See Weidlich v. Independent Asphalt Paving Co., 94 Wash. 395 at 405, 162 P. 541 
(1917). 
131 Strom v. Arcorace, 27 Wash. (2d) 478, 178 P. (2d) 959 (1947), cited 11 C.J.S. 
651 (1938), which cited Herse v. Mazza. 
132 Turner v. Creech, 58 Wash. 439, 108 P. 1084 (1910). 
133 Ross v. Turner, 13 Tenn. 338 (1833). This case does not seem to stand for the 
proposition relied on-location by a common grantor. There is a spare dictum which sug-
gests either the acquiescence doctrine or the principle of Lemed v. Morrill, 2 N.H. 197 
(1820). The Michigan case, Flynn v. Glenny, 51 Mich. 580, 17 N.W. 65 (1883), dis-
cussed at note 191 infra, was also cited by the court in Turner v. Creech. 
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the line or the making of improvements in reliance on it;134 indeed in 
most of the cases one or the other of these facts was present, although 
in two of them135 the facts do not make this clear, and the court rather 
stressed the fact that the party relying on the terms of his deed had 
notice of the marked line by virtue of improvements made in accord-
ance with it. 
The facts in practically all of the cases which apply sub-rule A 
show either that the party who was held bound by the marked line had 
notice thereof at the time he purchased or that there was subsequent 
acquiescence therein. Although the reported facts of a few of the cases 
may not dispel all doubt on this point, none of the cases indicate an 
application of the rule against a · clearly innocent and unsuspecting 
purchaser. If this is true, the cases can be objected to only because 
they reached the right decision on wrong or -misleading grounds. 
Where the fact of notice of a marked line to a grantee is stressed, very 
probably the decision can be supported by the existence of a mutual 
mistake in the drawing of one or more deeds, for which relief should 
be available against anyone who purchased with notice of it. As pre-
viously stated, no great objection can be made to affording such relief 
in a legal action, provided a court is careful to require proof that the 
mistake really was mutual and that no one who purchased without 
notice of it shall suffer because of it. It would certainly be preferable, 
however, if a court stated its rule for decision in such terms rather than 
by way of a proposition which defines only one characteristic element 
found in these cases-the marking of a line by a common grantor-
and ignores the others. 
The same may be said for the cases in which the decisive fact was 
acquiescence after a· conveyance in a line marked before the convey-
ance. Acquiescence presumably requires knowledge, or at least notice, 
of facts in which one may be held to have acquiesced. If knowledge 
or notice is imparted before one purchases, acquiescence may be un-
necessary. If it comes after the conveyance, certain questions arise as 
to what constitutes acquiescence and what facts must exist as a founda-
tion for it. These questions become especially urgent where a court 
adapts its acquiescence doctrine in these cases, as the Idaho and Okla-
homa courts seem to have done, so as not to require any definite period 
therefor. In any case where a court prefers a line on the ground to one 
134 See especially Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P. 1031, 136 P. 1146 (1913); 
Campbell v. Seattle, 59 Wash. 612, 110 P. 546 (1910); Turner v. Creech, 58 Wash. 439, 
108 P. 1084 (1910). 
13o Atwell v. Olson, 30 Wash. (2d) 179, 190 P. (2d) 783 (1948); Strom v. Arcorace, 
27 Wash. (2d) 478, 178 P. (2d) 959 (1947). 
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described in a deed, a fair disposition of the case requires an observance 
of a number of appropriate requirements or safeguards, the full ex-
tent of which is beyond the scope of this article. By simply stating sub-
rule A or the main rule, however, a court may at its discretion impose 
or dispense with any of such requirements. 
B. Authority Against the Rule 
The courts of a number of states, by decision or dicta, have declared 
themselves against the rule.136 It will be seen that several of the states 
whose cases are cited must have experienced the same topographical 
and historical conditions which have been offered in justification for 
the rule by the courts which are its leading proponents. In those cases 
where the courts stated theoretical objections to the application of the 
rule, the Parol Evidence Rule was most often referred to,137 or a propo-
sition which amounts to the same thing; that is, that monuments or 
other boundaries on the ground will control certain calls of descrip-
tion in a deed only when they are themselves called for by the deed.138 
Or the same thing may be implied by a statement that proof of the 
parties' acts on the ground is admissible only where the deed is equivo-
lSG Alabama: Wilson v. Connor, 219 Ala. 344, 122 S. 404 (1929). California: 
Powers v. Jackson, 50 Cal. 428 (1875); Williams v. Hebbard, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 686, 
92 P. (2d) 657 (1939). Connecticut: See Kashman v. Parsons, 70 Conn. 295 at 303, 39 
A. 179 (1898). Cf. Patzloff v. Kasperovich, ll6 Conn. 440, 165 A. 349 (1933). Georgia: 
Hall v. Davis, 122 Ga. 252 (1904). Illinois: Duggan v. Uppendahl, 197 Ill. 179, 64 
N.E. 289 (1902). IO'llla: Messer v. Reginnitter, 32 Iowa 312 (1871). Kentucky: Law-
rence v. Wheeler, 285 Ky. 288, 147 S.W. (2d) 698 (1941). See other Kentucky cases 
discussed at note 79 supra. Maine: Linscott v. Fernald, 5 Me. 496 (1829). See White 
v. Jones, 67 Me. 20 at 24 (1877). Cf. Wiswell v. Marston, 54 Me. 270 (1866). Massa-
c1msetts: Cleaveland v. Flagg, 58 Mass. 76 (1849). Cf. Miles v. Barrows, 122 Mass. 579 
(1877), discussed note 109 supra. Michigan: Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 
19 (1843). Cf. Lundberg v. Wolbrink, 331 Mich. 596, 50 N.W. (2d) 168 (1951), with 
which compare Nordberg v. Todd, 254 Mich. 440, 236 N.W. 826 (1931). New Jersey: 
See Jackson v. Perrine, 35 N.J.L. 137 at 142 (1871). New York: Gleason v. Shuart, 142 
App. Div. 320, 127 N.Y.S. 101 (19II); Clark v. Baird, 9 N.Y. 183 (1853); Clark v. 
Wethey, 19 Wend. (N.Y.) 320 (1838). Ohio: McAfferty v. Conover's Lessee, 7 Ohio St. 
99 (1857), cited note 103 supra. Oregon: Hennigan v. Matthews, 79 Ore. 622, 155 P. 
169 (1916); Crandall v. Mary, 67 Ore. 18, 135 P. 188 (1913); Talbot v. Smith, 56 Ore. 
ll7, 107 P. 480, 108 P. 125 (1910). Texas: See discussion of Texas cases at note 152 
infra. Virginia: Trimmer v. Martin, 141 Va. 252, 126 S.E. 217 (1925); Bradshaw v. 
Booth, 129 Va. 19, 105 S.E. 555 (1921). See Richmond Cedar Works v. West, 152 Va. 
533 at 541, 147 S.E. 196 (1929). West Virginia: Cf. Winding Gulf Colliery Co. v. 
Campbell, 72 W.Va. 449 at 466, 78 S.E. 384 (1913); Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v. 
Peytona Carmel Coal Co., 8 W.Va. 406 at 4i6 (1875). 
137 Wilson v. Connor, 219 Ala. 344, 122 S. 404 (1929); Linscott v. Fernald, 5 Me. 
496 (1829); Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, l Doug. (Mich.) 19 (1843); Gleason v. 
Shuart, 142 App. Div. 320, 127 N.Y.S. 101 (1911). 
138 Powers v. Jackson, 50 Cal. 428 (1875); Kashman v. Parsons, 70 Conn. 295, 39 
A. 179 (1898); Cleaveland v. Flagg, 58 Mass. 76 (1849); Talbot v. Smith, 56 Ore. 117, 
107 P. 480, 108 P. 125 (1910); Trimmer v. Martin, 141 Va. 252, 126 S.E. 217 (1925). 
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cal.139 The Statute of Frauds was mentioned as a bar in two New York 
cases,140 one of which also offered the principle of the merger of oral 
agreements in the deed.141 These further terse indictments of the rule 
have been found: 
"To admit parol proof of a marked line, nowhere mentioned 
in the deed, but entirely variant from its calls, would serve to ren-
der titles to real estate dependent, not on deeds of conveyance, and 
the language of the grantor, and courses, distances and monu-
ments, but on the mere memory of witnesses."142 
"If such be the law, it is useless in a survey or patent that there 
should be any calls for boundary."143 
The jeopardy to bona fide purchasers of an unqualified application of 
the rule is recognized: 
"It would create great confusion in titles if some subsequent 
innocent purchasers for value could be deprived of a considerable 
portion of his domain by parol proof of an intent existing in the 
minds of his predecessors in title of which he had no knowl-
edge."144 
It is implicit in this last statement, in view of the fact that the proof 
rejected was of a line marked with iron stakes, that while such proof 
may seem objective and therefore dependable, it must rest on further 
proof that the parties intended the marked boundaries to be those de-
scribed in the deed. It is this latter subjective element which is the rub, 
even if the rule were considered to be otherwise defensible. 
Statutes in Oregon and California stating the usual constructional 
preference for "permanent and visible or ascertained boundaries or 
monuments" over measurements, although as misleading and equivocal 
as the many dicta to the same effect, have been construed to refer only 
to such monuments or boundaries as are mentioned in the deed.145 
In Nordberg v. Todd146 the Michigan court used language which 
seems to be an approval of the rule, and in fact marked lines were held 
139 Jackson v. Perrine, 35 N.J.L. 137 at 142 (1871). 
140 Clark v. Baird, 9 N.Y. 183 (1853); Clark v. Wethey, 19 Wend. (N.Y.) 320 
(1838). 
141Clark v. Wethey, note 140 supra. 
142 Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 19 at 28 (1843). 
143 Lessee of Nash v. Atherton, 10 Ohio 163 at 170 (1840). 
144 Hennigan v. Matthews, 79 Ore. 622 at 625, 155 P. 169 (1916). See also Linscott 
v. Fernald, 5 Me. 496 (1829), where the protection of a bona fide purchaser was offered 
as one ground for the decision. 
145 Williams v. Hebbard, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 686, 92 P. (2d) 657 (1939); Hennigan 
v. Matthews, 79 Ore. 622, 155 P. 169 (1916); Talbot v. Smith, 56 Ore. 117, 107 P. 
480, 108 P. 125 (1910). 
146 254 Mich. 440, 236 N.W. 826 (1931). 
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to control distances called for in the deed. The appellant asserted 
against this result that the complainant was really seeking reformation 
rather than the construction for which he prayed. But the court said 
that reformation could be had under the complainant's prayer for gen-
eral relief, especially since the issue of reformation was specifically 
raised by the appellant's cross-bill. That the court regards such a result 
as attainable only in equity, upon pleading and proof of mutual mis-
take, is further emphasized by the recent case, Lundberg v. Wol-
brink,147 where the court refused to depart from the boundaries called 
for in an action of ejectment in which the plaintiff won, and which is 
all the more striking because the boundary so fixed ran through a gaso-
line station on the defendant's premises.148 
In Messer v. Reginnitter-49 the defendant offered a loaded instruc-
tion to the trial court which put the rule in an appealing guise. It was 
to the effect that monuments set by the parties as boundaries were to 
be considered as stronger evidence of the true boundaries than meas-
urements made many years after. The court evidently saw through 
this maneuver and refused the instruction, and this was affirmed on 
appeal. Clearly it was the language of the deed which really was un-
der attack, not the fallibility of a later survey which purported to follow 
it. The court said that any such proposition, which takes no account 
of the correctness of the survey, needs no refutation. 
Crandall v. Mary1 50 presents an interesting variation of fact. The 
deed in question called for the northeast corner of a block but did not 
purport to describe where that corner was located. The court held that 
the comer was located as indicated by existing sidewalks and build-
ings. The plaintiff claimed that the corner originally had been set 
and marked on the ground at some other point. But the court held 
that, since such point was not indicated by anything in the deed, it 
could not control the description in the deed. It might have been 
argued that the proof offered in fact did not vary the terms of the deed, 
since it is always possible to prove where monuments called for by a 
deed are in fact located. It is one thing to say that the location of exist-
ing structures is better evidence of the location of a street corner than 
the evidence offered by the plaintiff; but, since both are extrinsic, 
it may be doubted whether one but not the other should be rejected 
147 331 Mich. 596, 50 N.W. (2d) 168 (1951). 
148 The same remedial distinction was recognized in an early Maine case, Linscott v. 
Fernald, 5 Me. 496 (1829). But cf. Maes v. Ohnsted, 247 Mich. 180, 225 N.W. 583 
(1929), discussed at note 116 supra. 
149 32 Iowa 312 (1871). 
150 67 Ore. 18, 135 P. 188 (1913). 
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on that account. This is an odd variation in facts, for, although street 
comers have been determined according to existing structures in other 
cases, this usually has been accomplished by an application of the rule, 
rather than a rejection of it.151 
The Texas Cases 
The courts of 'Texas have concerned themselves with the rule in 
more cases than are to be found in any other state. This is not surpris-
ing in view of the constant reiteration in that state of the proposition 
that in any boundary dispute the main objective is to "follow the foot-
steps of the surveyor." It may also be significant that, while Texas is 
topographically unlike the eastern states, it probably experienced com-
parable problems in the process of getting state lands into private own-
ership, particularly in the lack of an official system of surveying state 
lands like the United States government survey, so that metes and 
bounds descriptions, with all their deficiencies, predominated. 
The rule was given appreciable recognition in the early cases. The 
first case in which the question was raised, Urquhart 11. Burleson,152 
involved complicated and ambiguously stated facts about the descrip-
tion in a patent, and it is not clear that the description was not actually 
ambiguous. In any event the land as surveyed was held to pass by the 
patent, the court relying on Person 11. Roundtree,153 which it called a 
Tennessee case. It was also not clear in two later cases whether the 
patents were ambiguous, but the court in one of them154 stated the 
rule about the priority of monuments over courses and distances, with-
out specifying that such monuments had to be called for in the instru-
ment; and in the other case155 the court quoted with approval from the 
leading Pennsylvania case, Blasdell 11. Bissell.156 These three cases 
were cited in Dalby 11. Booth157 to justify a definite application of the 
rule. 
151 It has been held that a call for a street means the street as actually laid out, as 
against evidence of some other location, such as that indicated on an official city map not 
referred to in the deed. Falls Village Water Power Co. v. Tibbetts, 31 Conn. 165 (1862); 
Hill v. Taylor, 296 Mass. 107, 4 N.E. (2d) 1008 (1936); Hunt v. Keye, 150 Minn. 142, 
184 N.W. 840 (1921); Barrows v. Webster, 144 N.Y. 422, 39 N.E. 357 (1895); Black-
man v. Riley, 138 N.Y. 318, 34 N.E. 214 (1893). The same result has been reached 
where the deed referred to a map. Burke v. Henderson, 54 App. Div. 157, 66 N.Y.S. 468 
(1900). Compare the problem discussed in Part II below. 
152 6 Tex. 502 (1851). 
153 Discussed at note 12 supra. 
154 Hubert v. Bartlett's Heirs, 9 Tex. 97 (1852). 
155 Bolton v. Lann, 16 Tex. 96 (1856). 
156 6 Pa. 258 (1847), discussed at note 53 supra. 
157 16 Tex. 564 (1856). 
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The next year, however, the court in Anderson 11. Stamps1158 held 
that the lines of a survey as marked on the ground could control the 
courses and distances only when such lines were called for in the 
instrument.159 
Since Anderson 11. Stamps the rule has been approved by dictum 
in one case,1°0 and the court has purported to apply it on other occa-
sions which, however, involved conflicts between the calls of the in-
struments in question.161 The latter, therefore, cannot be classed as 
decisions in support of the rule. In several of these the "footsteps" rule 
was stated as governing.162 In Millerman 11. Megaritty,1 63 where there 
was a conflict between calls, some of which were consistent with the 
survey, the court stated the rule, and added that the suit partook of the 
nature of a suit for reformation, which was denied on the ground that 
no mistake was proved and, even if it had been, it would not be avail-
able against the defendant, who took title in good faith and in ignorance 
of the mistake. The case is of interest because the alleged mistake, if 
it could have been sustained, would have operated against rather than 
in support of the rule. 
It sometimes happens that a deed will call for the corner of another 
tract of land (or "survey," as a tract originally granted in Texas is 
usually designated), and it will later be discovered that the true corner 
is not where the parties to the deed or the surveyor thought it was. 
Koenigheim 11. Miles1 64 was such a case, but there were other calls 
which supported the boundaries as actually surveyed. Such boundaries 
were held to prevail, and properly, because of the conflict between the 
calls. But the court went on to say, "The rule is general that the 
boundaries of a grant as actually surveyed are the limits of the grantee's 
right, arid will control calls for the unascertained boundaries of existing 
115s 19 Tex. 460 (1857). 
150 Anderson v. Stamps was distinguished in Booth v. Upshur, 26 Tex. 64 (1861), 
where there was an inconsistency between the calls. Parol evidence was also admitted in 
Hughes v. Sandal, 25 Tex. 162 (1860), but the court added the startling proposition that 
the Parol Evidence Rule is applicable only to the parties to the instrument, not to those 
claiming under them. 
160 Welder v. Carroll, 29 Tex. 318 at 333 (1867). 
161 Burnett v. Burriss, 39 Tex. 501 (1873); Williams v. May.field, 57 Tex. 364 (1882); 
Fulton v. Frandolig, 63 Tex. 330 (1885); Montague County v. Clay County Land & Cattle 
Co., 80 Tex. 392, 15 S.W. 902 (1891); Millerman v. Megaritty, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 
242 s.w. 757. 
162 The court of civil appeals purported to apply the rule in Lutcher & Moore Lumber 
Co. v. Hart, 26 S.W. 94 (1894), but the inadequate reporting of the facts leaves the case 
without discernible significance. 
163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 242 S.W. 757. 
164 67 Tex. 113, 2 S.W. 81 (1886). 
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surveys."165 It is difficult to know what the court meant by "the un-
ascertained boundaries of existing surveys." Every separate tract of 
land has boundaries the location of which can be ascertained by some 
means. If the parties to a deed call for a boundary of another tract, and 
later show that they were mistaken as to the location of such boundary, 
this hardly constitutes an excuse for ignoring the calls of their deed and 
looking solely to the survey on the ground, in the absence of a proper 
basis for reformation, or unless the calls of their deed are conllicting 
or ambiguous. In Plummer v. McLain166 the court "corrected" the calls 
of a patent to conform to the survey in an action of trespass to try title. 
This result does not seem too objectionable, since it was found that 
the defendant filed his claim to adjacent land with notice of the extent 
of the plaintiff's claim. The court, however, said that it was not nec-
essary to resort to equity to make such a correction, since this did not 
really reform the patent, but was only to aid in rightly interpreting 
. the description. The real difference between reforming an instrument 
and "correcting" it in aid of interpretation was not made clear. Other 
courts which have approved the rule have not gotten so far out on a 
limb in their efforts to explain the rule as one of construction rather 
than of reformation.167 
Except for the cases mentioned above, the Texas courts have repeat-
edly rejected the rule by decision168 and dictum,169 and have repeatedly 
stated that resort can be had to proof of marked lines only when there 
is an inconsistency between or ambiguity in the calls of the instrument, 
165 Id. at 123. See also Busk v. Manghum, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 621, 37 S.W. 460 
(1896); Chesson v. La Flore, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 191 S.W. 745. 
166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 192 S.W. 571. 
167 The court also made a distinction which seemed to go something like this: the 
survey will prevail over slightly inconsistent calls of a deed, and where it is clear that in 
general the survey is that which the deed purported to call for, but it will not prevail 
where it is entirely repugnant to the calls of the instrument. For similar distinctions see 
cases cited notes 20 and 104 supra. 
168 Schaeffer v. Berry, 62 Tex. 705 (1884); Reast v. Donald, 84 Tex. 648, 19 S.W. 
795 (1892); Jamison v. New York & T. Land Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) 77 S.W. 969; 
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Anderson, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 121, 81 S.W. 781 (1904); Hamilton 
v. Blackbum, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 153, 95 S.W. 1094 (1906); Brodbent v. Carper, (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1907) 100 S.W. 183; Davis v. George, 104 Tex. 106, 134 S.W. 326 (1911); 
Hays v. Clawson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 286 S.W. 857; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. 
Jones, 138 Tex. 67, 158 S.W. (2d) 548 (1941). 
169 Johnson v. Archibald, 78 Tex. 96 at 102, 14 S.W. 266 (1890); Converse v. 
Langshaw, 81 Tex. 275 at 278, 16 S.W. 1031 (1891); Thompson v. Langdon, 87 Tex. 
254 at 258, 28 S.W. 931 (1894); Hamman v. San Jacinto Rice Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 
229 S.W. 1008, revd. on other grounds, 247 S.W. 500 (1923); Wilson v. Giraud, 111 
Tex. 253 at 263, 231 S.W. 1074 (1921); Gill v. Peterson, 126 Tex. 216 at 222, 86 S.W. 
(2d) 629 (1935); Blake v. The Pure Oil Co., 128 Tex. 536 at 544, 100 S.W. (2d) 1009 
(1937). 
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or when such marked lines have themselves been called for by the 
instrument. In rejecting the rule, the court in Brodhent 11. Carper 70 
remarked that the plaintiff did not plead mistake or ask for reformation 
on that ground. In Hamman 11. San Jacinto Rice Company171 the 
"footsteps" rule was placed in proper perspective by this statement: 
"The 'footsteps of the surveyor' will not be followed outside the bound-
aries fixed by the field notes of the grant when such boundaries can 
be found and identified upon the ground." 
C. Conclusion 
Anyone who adheres to a statistical jurisprudence expressed in terms 
of the "weight of authority" could, in one view of the above cases, 
announce that the cases supporting the rule far outnumber those which 
reject it. It would be less misleading, however, to state the fact that, 
outside of three or four states, the authority for the rule in the form 
originally announced is slight and inconclusive, as well as being out-
weighed by the number of opposing cases. Nor is there any notice-
able tendency for the rule in its original form to break loose into new 
jurisdictions. But the rather more recent appearance of the rule in a 
somewhat different guise--practical location by a common granter-is 
disquieting. It does not appear that any harm has come of this as yet, 
because the application of the rule in this form has so far usually been 
confined to facts which might have justified the decisions on other 
grounds. But an obvious danger remains so long as the obvious and 
necessary restrictions upon the rule remain undefined. 
Mention probably should be made of the fact that a majority of the 
states have not had occasion to declare themselves at all on the question. 
There may be some reason to count these states as constituting a "silent 
vote" against the rule, for in predicting the outcome of a case before a 
court which has not yet committed itself, the presumption would appear 
to favor a rejection of this aberration in the law; and the silence on the 
subject could signify that no one had had the temerity to contend for it, 
or indeed had even thought of it. 
The reasons mentioned for the early adoption of the rule by those 
courts which constitute its stronghold may explain its adoption without 
wholly justifying it. Those circumstances may well justify the princi-
ple that calls for monuments are the more reliable and, therefore, should 
be preferred to other calls. It is more difficult to believe that such cir-
110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) 100 S.W. 183. 
171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 229 S.W. 1008 at 1012. 
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cumstances provide an excuse for resorting to monuments or lines which 
the parties did not choose to specify in their deed. At any rate, it may 
be doubted that these reasons still exist. It may also be inferred that 
the same circumstances existed in other states which did not adopt the 
rule. In those few states with substantial authority for the rule, the 
established requirements and limitations of the more appropriate rem-
edy of reformation have in some cases been ignored, expressly rejected 
. in others, yet expressly recognized on occasion, usually in the more 
recent cases. Ii may be that eventually most if not all of these courts • 
will settle upon a rule which would be no more than an innocuous 
application of equitable principles in actions at law. The continuing 
danger of ignoring the safeguards of reformation lies in the view that 
the rule is really only one of construction. ' 
We could rest with more confidence that the law would remain 
free of general infection in this regard if we could bring this inquiry to 
a close at this point. But this is not all of the story. Our rule has been 
given further life by being offered in another and perhaps more appeal-
ing guise. This development remains to be considered. 
II. PLAT v. SURVEY-SUB-RULE B 
The problem here is raised by the proposition stated in the second 
of the two passages quoted at the beginning of this article. When a 
description in a deed, usually of a· city lot, and usually by lot and block 
references, contains such words as these, "according to recorded plat 
thereof," or words of similar import, and it is later found that the survey 
on which the plat was based varies from the plat, which of the two will 
prevail in a dispute over boundaries? It is well established that a ref-
erence in a deed to a plat, like that quoted above, is sufficient to incor-
porate the plat in the deed as if it had been set out therein. It is assumed 
that there is no other language in the deed which would justify a find-
ing that the description was ambiguous. But the rule to be examined 
here nevertheless states that the survey on the ground will control the 
plat. It is obvious at the outset that this is nothing other than a special 
application of the general rule previously discussed. The reason for 
treating it separately is that the courts have done so. A moment's look 
at the cases cited for and against the two rules will show little correla-
tion on either side. Some courts have adopted or rejected one rule 
without having had to consider the other; but more important, a few 
courts have declared themselves for one of the rules but against the 
other, and without recognition of the similarity between them. Since 
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the two rules are related in principle, the one to be considered at this 
point, although separately from the other, will for convenience be 
referred to as "sub-rule B." 
There is one significant difference between the two rules. Since the 
main rule is stated in terms of boundaries marked on the ground by the 
parties to a deed prior to the conveyance, proof necessary to invoke the 
rule likely will be sufficient proof of mutual mistake in drafting the 
deed. For this reason the main rule can often be justified in its appli-
cation where the interests of a bona £.de purchaser are not involved. 
But under sub-rule B as stated the survey determines the boundaries 
without regard to whether either or both of the parties participated in 
it or knew of it. This poses a special problem. N0t only will there be 
involved the rights of a possible subsequent purchaser without notice 
of the surveyed boundaries, which is similar to the problem created by 
the main rule, but there will be the further question whether the 
mistake in drawing the plat was in fact a mistake of both or either of 
the parties to the deed. For this reason, as well as for other obvious 
reasons, it will be necessary in examining the cases, not only to look 
for the reasons given for adopting this rule, but also to pay especial 
attention to the factual circumstances to which the rule has been 
applied. 
The rule has been adopted by the courts of a considerable number 
of states.172 Authorities specifically rejecting it are surprisingly few .173 
112 Arkansas: Pyburn v. Campbell, 158 Ark. 321, 250 S.W. 15 (1923). California: 
O'Farrel v. Hamey, 51 Cal. 125 (1875); Arnold v. Hanson, 91 Cal. App. (2d) 15, 204 
P. (2d) 97 (1949). See Andrews v. Wheeler, IO Cal. App. 614 at 616, 103 P. 144 
(1909). Cf. Penry v. Richards, 52 Cal. 496 (1877); Cleveland v. Choate, 77 Cal. 73 
(1888); Burke v. McCowen, 115 Cal. 481 (1896). Illinois: Decatur v. Niedermeyer, 168 
Ill. 68, 48 N.E. 72 (1897); Bauer v. Gottmanhausen, 65 Ill. 499 (1872). Indiana: Evans-
ville v. Page, 23 Ind. 525 (1864). Iowa: Tomlinson v. Golden, 157 Iowa 237, 138 N.W. 
448 (1912); Thrush v. Graybill, 110 Iowa 585, 81 N.W. 798 (1900); Root v. Cincinnati, 
87 Iowa 202, 54 N.W. 206 (1893); Bradstreet v. Dunham, 65 Iowa 248, 21 N.W. 592 
(1884). Maine: Stetson v. Adams, 91 Me. 178, 39 A. 575 (1898); Bean v. Bachelder, 
78 Me. 184, 3 A. 279 (1886); Williams v. Spaulding, 29 Me. 112 (1848); Esmond v. 
Tarbox, 7 Me. 61 (1830). See also Coleman v. Lord, 96 Me. 192 at 194, 52 A. 645 
(1902); Ripley v. Berry, 5 Me. 24 at 25 (1827); Brown v. Gay, 3 Me. 126 at 129 (1824). 
Cf. Proctor v. Carey, 142 Me. 226, 49 A. (2d) 323 (1946) (lack of proof of survey); 
Bussey v. Grant, 20 Me. 281 (1841) (map not referred to); Heaton v. Hodges, 14 Me. 
66 (1836) (lack of proof of survey); Thomas v. Patten, 13 Me. 329 (1836). Michigan: 
See discussion of Michigan cases at note 188 infra. Minnesota: Hunt v. Keye, 150 Minn. 
142, 184 N.W. 840 (1921); Turnbull v. Schroeder, 29 Minn. 49, 11 N.W. 147 (1882). 
Cf. Arms v. City of Owatonna, 117 Minn. 20, 134 N.W. 298 (1912) (ambiguity in 
deed). Missouri: See discussion of Missouri cases at note 208 infra. Nebraska: Holst v. 
Streitz, 16 Neb. 249, 20 N.W. 307 (1884). New Hampshire: Hall v. Davis, 36 N.H. 
569 (1858). New Jersey: O'Brien v. King, 49 N.J.L. 79, 7 A. 34 (1886). New York: 
Weinheimer v. Ross, 80 Misc. 269, 141 N.Y.S. 55 (1913), affd. 214 N.Y. 630, 108 N.E. 
1110 (1915); Jackson v. Freer, 17 Johns (N.Y.) 29 (1819). See also Hastings v. 
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Of the cases supporting the rule, a few contain special circumstances 
which are offered in justification for the decisions. In two cases the 
plats contained the words "as surveyed by me," or the equivalent, 
which were said to amount to a call for the survey in the deeds.174 
Obviously these courts were trying to squeeze the facts into the area 
of ambiguous or conllicting descriptions, and so justify the admission 
of proof of the surveys to control the specifications of the plats. Another 
court construed a reference in the deed to a map to be merely for the 
purpose of locating the block in which the land lay and for no other 
purpose.175 In an early New York case the court said its decision was 
required by specific legislation governing the particular type of allot-
ment which was involved.176 
Several different arguments for applying the rule, apart from spe-
cial factual situations, are to be found in the cases. The principle that 
"monuments control courses and distances" has been misapplied in this 
situation so as to prefer marked lines not called for.177 So has the prin-
ciple that government-survey boundaries are as they were fixed by the 
official surveyor, which overlooks the obvious difference between de-
scribing land "according to government survey thereof" and "according 
to recorded plat thereof."178 A Texas court, apparently in an unguarded 
moment, picked up its old "footsteps" rule to serve in the present 
circumstances,179 which is a little surprising in view of its apparently 
having escaped from that error in dealing with the main rule.180 The 
McDonough, 13 App. Div. 625, 43 N.Y.S. 628 at 629 (1897); Van Wyck v. Wright and 
Johnson, 18 Wend. (N.Y.) 157 (1837). Cf. Smith v. Stacey, 68 App. Div. 521, 73 
N.Y.S. 1022 (1902) (conflict between map and other descriptive calls); Burke v. Hender-
son, 54 App. Div. 157, 66 N.Y.S. 468 (1900); Jackson v. Cole, 16 Johns (N.Y.) 257 
(1818). Oregon: See Bemitt v. Marshfield, 89 Ore. 556 at 562, 174 P. 1153 (1918). 
Pennsylvania: Rozelle v. Lewis, 37 Pa. Super. 563 (1908). Texas: Smith v. Boone, 84 
Tex. 526, 19 S.W. 702 (1892); Fulford v. Heath, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 212 S.W. (2d) 
649; Taft v. Ward, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 124 S.W. 437 (1909). Vennont: See Neill 
v. Ward, 103 Vt. 117 at 148, 153 A. 219 (1930). Washington: Neeley v. Maurer, 31 
Wash. (2d) 153, 195 P. (2d) 628 (1948); Olson v. Seattle, 30 Wash. 687, 71 P. 201 
(1903). Wisconsin: Racine v. J. I. Case Plow Co., 56 Wis. 539, 14 N.W. 599 (1883); 
Fleischfresser v. Schmidt, 41 Wis. 223 (1876). Cf. Marsh v. Mitchell, 25·Wis. 706 (1868). 
173 Daniels v. Davis, 3!1 Ky. 293, 223 S.W. (2d) 998 (1949); Townsend v. Hayt, 
51 Barb. (N.Y.) 334 (1868); Trimmer v. Martin, 141 Va. 252, 126 S.E. 217 (1925). 
See discussion of Missouri cases at note 208 infra. 
174 Penry v. Richards, 52 Cal. 496 (1877); Turnbull v. Schroeder, 29 Minn. 49, 11 
N.W. 147 (1882). 
11s Burke v. Henderson, 54 App. Div. 157, 66 N.Y.S. 468 (1900). 
176 Jackson v. Cole, 16 Johns (N.Y.) 257 (1818). 
177 O'Farrel v. Hamey, 51 Cal. 125 (1875). 
178 Bauer v. Gottmanhausen, 65 ill. 499 (1872); Root v. Cincinnati, 87 Iowa 202, 
54 N.W. 206 (1893). 
110 Taft v. Ward, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 124 S.W. 437 (1909). 
1so See discussion of Texas cases at note 152 supra. 
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opinion has been expressed that early town plats and surveys were 
notoriously inaccurate and that the only way to avoid a virtual chaos of 
boundaries is to rely on monuments actually established and, after they 
are gone, on improvements made in accordance therewith.181 On this 
point the Wisconsin court said, "At almost any time in the course of 
municipal history, to rely upon the figures, courses, and distances of 
the original plat and survey, or upon a resurvey upon the data thereof, 
would .be utterly subversive of the rights of real property, and of 
public and private interests."182 This is reminiscent of the argument 
offered by courts favoring the main rule. The argument that proof of 
marked boundaries not called for violates the Statute of Frauds was 
denied by one court.183 
By far the most commonly found excuse for sub-rule B is that the 
survey is the substance, the original, the legally operative fact, of which 
the plat is only a picture, a representation, a delineation on paper.184 
This means, of course, that the plat is subordinate, and can never over-
come that which it merely represents. There was a time, centuries ago, 
when such a statement would have expressed the primitive concept of 
conveyancing then in vogue. But as a principle of modem convey-
ancing, such a shadow-and-substance argument is so specious on its 
face that one is moved to ask, "Now what was the real reason why the 
court decided as it did?" 
The facts of a large percentage of the cases are revealing in this 
regard, in several particulars, some of which have already been men-
tioned; although we would be better off in this regard, as in the cases 
dealing with the main rule, if we knew more than we are told in most 
of the opinions. Mention has already been made of the view of some 
courts that plats or other records of surveys are not to be trusted. One 
may doubt, however, the relevance of such an observation where the 
parties to a deed have chosen to incorporate the plat therein. Apart 
from this, if these courts mean only that marks on the ground are the 
more reliable indicia of the intention of the parties to a conveyance, is 
there any reason for adopting a rule of law which assumes, where plat 
and survey conflict, that the plat is always wrong, and which leaves no 
room for proof in particular cases that the plat was right, or at least that 
one or both parties relied on it? It seems, however, that these courts 
181 Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601 at 605 (1878); Racine v. J. I. Case Plow Co., 56 
Wis. 539 at 541, 14 N.W. 599 (1883). 
182Racine v. J. I. Case Plow Co., 56 Wis. 539 at 541, 14 N.W. 599 (1883). 
183 Rozelle v. Lewis, 37 Pa. Super. 563 (1908), discussed at note 63 supra. 
184 See Whitehead v. Ragan, 106 Mo. 231 at 235, 17 S.W. 307 (1891), quoted at 
note 2 supra. 
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had something more in mind. They were concerned about the gen-
erally unsettling effect of upsetting marked boundaries long relied upon. 
Thus the more significant fact is not the marking of the boundaries but 
the general reliance upon them. Where this is in fact the problem, the 
way out may be plain; but it does not require sub-rule B to reach it. 
We have moved into that area of law having to do with the effect of 
the conduct of the parties subsequent to the conveyance. This is the 
area of boundaries by acquiescence, estoppel, etc. Where these prin-
ciples are applicable, a decision favoring the boundary so established 
may be justified. But attention must be directed to some cases in which 
such principles were used as a ground for decision in addition to sub-
rule B.185 In other cases the facts were such as to indicate, or at least 
to suggest the possibility, that the decisions could have been based on 
such a ground.186 In still other cases it is obvious that the courts were 
impressed by the fact that a decision preferring the plat would have 
upset recognized boundaries, not only of the lots in question, but also 
those in an entire block or other large area.187 
The Michigan cases deserve special attention in this regard. In 
Diehl 11. Zanger188 the court established a line according to a fence of 
long standing and based its decision on the acquiescence principle. 
Judge Cooley, however, in a concurring opinion, added another ground 
for decision. He fell into the error which other courts have made of 
equating these cases with the cases involving government-survey bound-
aries,189 so that the question could be only one of determining where 
the boundaries were established on the ground by the original survey. 
He even went so far as to say that if such boundaries were no longer 
discoverable on the ground, the question would be only one of proving 
where they had been. Then he added the argument previously men-
tioned about the unreliability of early town plats and the general con-
185 Decatur v. Niedermeyer, 168 lli. 68, 48 N.E. 72 (1897); Bauer v. Gottmanhausen, 
65 lli. 499 (1872); Evansville v. Page, 23 Ind. 525 (1864); Neill v. Ward, 103 Vt. 117, 
153 A. 219 (1930). 
186 Root v. Cincinnati, 87 Iowa 202, 54 N.W. 206 (1893); Hunt v. Keye, 150 Minn. 
142, 184 N.W. 840 (1921); Holst v. Streitz, 16 Neb. 249, 20 N.W. 307 (1884); O'Brien 
v. King, 49 N.J.L. 79, 7 A. 34 (1886); Burke v. Henderson, 54 App. Div. 157, 66 
N.Y.S. 468 (1900); Smith v. Stacey, 68 App. Div. 521, 73 N.Y.S. 1022 (1902); Rozelle 
v. Lewis, 37 Pa. Super. 563 (1908); Smith v. Boone, 84 Tex. 526, 19 S.W. 702 (1892); 
Olson v. Seattle, 30 Wash. 687, 71 P. 201 (1903); Marsh v. Mitchell, 25 Wis. 706 (1868). 
187 Arnold v. Hanson, 91 Cal. App. (2d) 15, 204 P. (2d) 97 (1949); Tomlinson 
v. Golden, 157 Iowa 237, 138 N.W. 448 (1912); Jackson v. Freer, 17 Johns (N.Y.) 
29 (1819); Racine v. J. I. Case Plow Co., 56 Wis. 539, 14 N.W. 599 (1883). 
188 39 Mich. 601 (1878). 
189 See cases cited note 178 supra. See also exclusion No. 4, p. 649 supra. 
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fusion of title which would follow an effort to adhere to them, presum-
ably after long reliance on boundaries otherwise established, saying, 
"Indeed the mischiefs that must follow would be simply incalculable, 
and the visitation of the surveyor might well be set down as a great 
public calamity."190 
In Flynn v. Glenny191 the parties to the suit built a boundary fence 
according to previously established marks on the ground and continued ' 
to recognize this fence as a boundary for nearly ten years. In a suit 
growing out of the discovery that this boundary varied from that indi-
cated on the plat, the court decided on the basis of the boundary fence. 
The opinion of the court, written by Judge Cooley, contains this 
statement: 
"Purchasers of town lots have a right to locate them according 
to the stakes which they find planted and recognized, and no sub-
sequent survey can be allowed to unsettle their lines. The question 
afterwards is not whether the stakes were where they should have 
been in order to make them correspond with the lot lines as they 
should be if the platting were done with absolute accuracy, but it 
is whether they were planted by authority, and the lots were pur-
chased and taken possession of in reliance on them. If such was 
the case they must govern, notwithstanding any errors in locating 
them."192 
Several other Michigan cases were cited, all of which, however, had to 
do with boundaries by acquiescence. It is not clear from the opinion, 
therefore, whether the survey will control the plat in any event, whether 
it will control provided the parties have purchased in reliance upon it, 
or whether the parties also must have acquiesced therein for a period of 
time. In Beaubien v. Kellogg, 193 although the facts are not entirely 
clear, it seems that there was an ambiguity in the plat, which would 
have justified the decision approving the admission of proof of the 
survey. But the court quoted Judge Cooley's statement in Diehl v. 
Zanger. Flynn v. Glenny was followed in Le Compte v. Lueders,1 94 
on similar facts and with the same argument in support of the decision. 
The same probably may be said for Miller v. Michel,1 915 where the 
court also quoted the argument made in Flynn v. Glenny, although the 
190 39 Mich. 601 at 605 (1878). 
191 51 Mich. 580, 17 N.W. 65 (1883). 
192 Id. at 584. 
10a 69 Mich. 333, 37 N.W. 691 (1888). 
104 90 Mich. 495, 51 N.W. 542 (1892). 
105 227 Mich. 497, 198 N.W. 950 (1924). 
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facts do not so clearly indicate a boundary by acquiescence. White v. 
Peahody196 clearly involved a boundary by acquiescence, but the court 
in relying on Diehl v. Zanger spoke of that case as holding that a later 
survey is for the purpose of :finding where the original lines were drawn, 
not where they should have been drawn, and also that long practical 
acquiescence in a boundary may be conclusive. Diehl v. Zanger has 
been cited in numerous other Michigan cases, in all of which the deci-
sions turned on the acquiescence question.197 The case has also been 
cited in support of dicta that old fences are strong evidence in ascer-
taining boundaries.198 Flynn v. Glenny has also been cited in later 
cases, and in most of these the question was one of acquiescence199 or 
something other than the applicability of sub-rule B. 200 
There is ground for concluding that there is nothing in the Mich-
igan cases but a few dicta justifying a preference for marked lines except 
in cases involving boundaries by acquiescence. At least there is no case 
in which the decision was clearly and unequivocally based on sub-rule 
B.201 So long as that rule is con:6.ned, either in Michigan or elsewhere, 
to cases which also involve the acquiescence principle, there is neither 
need nor justi:6.cation for the rule, and its further reiteration will serve 
only to continue the danger that it may one day be applied to facts from 
which the real ground for preferring the survey is absent.202 
Suppose the facts of a case fall short of proving a boundary by 
acquiescence, but they do show that all parties to the boundary dispute 
purchased their respective lots in reliance upon or with the assumption 
that their boundaries were as shown by monuments on the ground, or 
at least with notice that others so relied. Later, one of them discovers, 
196 106 Mich. 144, 64 N.W. 41 (1895). 
197 See, e.g., Escher v. Bender, 338 Mich. 5, 61 N.W. (2d) 143 (1953); Marion v. 
Balsley, 195 Mich. 51, 161 N.W. 820 (1917); Veltmans v. Kurtz, 167 Mich. 412, 132 
N.W. 1009 (1911); Husted v. Willoughby, 117 Mich. 56, 75 N.W. 279 (1898); Car-
penter v. Monks, 81 Mich. 103, 45 N.W. 477 (1890); Case v. Trapp, 49 Mich. 59, 12 
N.W. 908 (1882). 
198 See, e.g., Anderson v. Wirth, 134 Mich. 612 at 614, 96 N.W. 926 (1903); Pugh v. 
Schindler, 127 Mich. 191 at 197, 86 N.W. 515 (1901); Hoffman v. Port Huron, 102 Mich. 
417 at 438, 60 N.W. 831 (1894); Carpenter v. Monks, 81 Mich. 103 at 109, 45 N.W. 
477 (1890). 
199 Jones v. Dosey, 224 Mich. 351, 195 N.W. 129 (1923); Breakey v. Woolsey, 149 
Mich. 86, 112 N.W. 719 (1907); Wilmarth v. Woodcock, 66 Mich. 331, 33 N.W. 400 
(1887). 
200 Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Tower Motor Truck Co., 222 Mich. 190, 192 N.W. 
634 (1923); Brown v. Milliman, 119 Mich. 606, 78 N.W. 785 (1899). See also Nord-
berg v. Todd, 254 Mich. 440, 236 N.W. 826 (1931), discussed at note 146 supra. 
201 Cf. Maes v. Olmsted, 247 Mich. 180, 225 N.W. 583 (1929), discussed at note 
116 supra. 
202 On the acquiescence principle in Michigan see comment, 39 MICH. L. R.Ev. 614 
(1941). 
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perhaps to his surprise, that the plat shows him entitled to more land 
than the monuments show; and accordingly he brings suit to recover the 
difference. A number of cases purporting to apply the rule seem pretty 
clearly to have involved some such circumstances.203 It may also be 
noted that in several of these cases, as well as in others in which the 
rule was applied,204 the question related to the proper location of a 
street, whether it was to be as shown on the plat or as laid out and used 
on the ground. There seems in these cases to have been general reli-
ance by purchasers of lots on the streets as laid out.205 In some of these 
cases the rule adopted is in fact limited in terms to controversies over 
the location of streets,206 as though the decision in such a case would 
not necessarily be applicable to boundary disputes generally. Actually 
there seems to be no difference in principle between the street cases 
and others, except that a court probably would be even more reluctant 
to prejudice the physical integrity of an opened street than a boundary 
otherwise located on the ground, certainly if the location of the street 
were indicated by its improvement at the time the lot in question was 
purchased. 207 
Is there justification, apart from sub-rule B, for preferring the sur-
veyed boundaries over those indicated by the plat in cases of this type? 
Reformation may again be suggested tentatively for this purpose, for 
the facts of these cases suggest the presence of mistake in failing prop-
erly to indicate on the plat the boundaries with respect to which the 
parties believed they were contracting. If this is so, the decisions in 
203 Tomlinson v. Golden, 157 Iowa 237, 138 N.W. 448 (1912); Thrush v. Graybill, 
110 Iowa 585, 81 N.W. 798 (1900); Root v. Cincinnati, 87 Iowa 202, 54 N.W. 206 
(1893); Hunt v. Keye, 150 Minn. 142, 184 N.W. 840 (1921); Burke v. Henderson, 54 
App. Div. 157, 66 N.Y.S. 468 (1900); Weinheimer v. Ross, 80 Misc. 269, 141 N.Y.S. 
55 (1913), affd. 214 N.Y. 630, 108 N.E. 1110 (1915); Rozelle v. Lewis, 37 Pa. Super. 
563 (1908); Fulford v. Heath, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 212 S.W. (2d) 649; Neeley v. 
Maurer, 31 Wash. (2d) 153, 195 P. (2d) 628 (1948); Racine v. J. I. Case Plow Co., 56 
Wis. 539, 14 N.W. 599 (1883); Marsh v. Mitchell, 25 Wis. 706 (1868). 
204 Evansville v. Page, 23 Ind. 525 (1864); Bradstreet v. Dunham, 65 Iowa 248, 21 
N.W. 592 (1884); Flynn v. Glenny, 51 Mich. 580, 17 N.W. 65 (1883); O'Brien v. King, 
49 N.J.L. 79, 7 A. 34 (1886). See Bernitt v. Marshfield, 89 Ore. 556 at 562, 174 P. 
1153 (1918). 
2os Cf. Evansville v. Page, 23 Ind. 525 (1864), where long acquiescence in the street 
was referred to. 
206 O'Brien v. King, 49 N.J.L. 79, 7 A. 34 (1886); Weinheimer v. Ross, 80 Misc. 
269, 141 N.Y.S. 55 (1913), affd. 214 N.Y. 630, 108 N.E. 1110 (1915); Burke v. 
Henderson, 54 App. Div. 157, 66 N.Y.S. 468 (1900). 
207 It is even easier to prefer the location of the street on the ground where, as in 
Burke v. Henderson, 54 App. Div. 157, 66 N.Y.S. 468 (1900), the deed not only refers 
to the plat, but also includes descriptive matter referring to the street. It would be gen-
erally conceded that a call in a deed for a street would be for the street as located in the 
absence of other language to the contrary. See exclusion No. 3, p. 649 supra. See also note 
151 supra. 
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these cases may be supported; but, as in the cases which suggest the 
presence of acquiescence, resort need not and should not be made to 
sub-rule B for this purpose. 
This is an appropriate place to discuss the history of the rule in 
Missouri. In Whitehead v. Ragan208 sub-rule B was applied on the 
often-mentioned ground that the plat was but a representation of the 
survey, like a certified copy of an instrument which will be controlled 
by the original, and also by way of misapplication of the principle that 
monuments control courses and distances. The losing party here was 
a remote grantee of the defendant, who was the original grantor, and 
there was nothing to indicate that he had purchased with knowledge 
of the survey. The same facts and the same parties were before the 
court again in Whitehead v. Atchison, 200 in which the court expressly 
overruled Whitehead v. Ragan. It is significant that the surveyed 
comers alleged to control the plat were hidden and apparently not 
known to any party involved prior to his purchase. The court said: 
"To announce and adhere to, as a fixed rule of law, without 
qualification, the proposition announced in the I 06 Mo., when 
these same litigants were then before the court, 'If the line between 
lots I and 4 was located upon the land when surveyed and sub-
divided, and can now be ascertained and determined, that line 
will constitute the true division line between the lots ... though it 
confljcts with the description given in the plat,' when lots are sold 
by their lot number according to the subdivision plat, would be to 
involve the entire communities of our cities ( where in most in-
stances all conveyances of property are made by lot number simply, 
with a reference to the recorded plats for locating the courses and 
distances of the boundaries) in confusion and doubt as to the sta-
bility and fixedness of their possession and rights. . . . If the 
courses and distances as indicated on the plat of which his lot is a 
part, are to be overturned, as in this case is sought by the hidden 
comers, or what is still worse by the testimony of the surveyor him-
self twenty odd years after the survey was made, that he estab-
lished a line at a point thirty or fifty feet from where he certifies 
on the plat made by himself that it was located, the lot owner 
can know nothing of his boundaries. . . . Between the purchaser 
of a lot and one who promulgates a plat describing and defining 
the lots thereof, the purchaser will not be held at his peril to ascer-
tain whether or not the plat agrees with the original survey of the 
land subdivided and platted; but he is justified in assuming that 
2os 106 Mo. 231, 17 S.W. 307 (1891). 
200 136 Mo. 485, 37 S.W. 928 (1896). 
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the plat is correct, and that the lot or lots purchased by him are 
of the dimensions, and bounded by the courses and distances as 
indicated on the plat, to which, for particulars, his deed must refer, 
when the lot number alone is given in the deed."210 
But only four years later, in McKinney 11. Doane,211 the court approved 
an instruction to the jury that when a grantee buys a lot after stakes set 
by a survey are pointed out to him, and takes possession and makes 
improvements on the basis thereof, the boundary will be set according 
to such stakes as between the parties to the conveyance and any sub-
sequent grantee who knows thereof.212 The court said that when no 
monuments are called for by the deed, the courses and distances shown 
on the plat must govern (citing the Atchison case), unless there is a 
conflict between the plat and an actual survey, in which case the latter 
will control ( citing cases from other jurisdictions which adopt sub-rule 
B). But the court went on to say that in fact there was no conflict here 
between the plat and the survey. The court of appeals in Bast 11. 
Mason213 followed the Atchison principle in approving the refusal of 
an instruction below which would have fixed the boundary according 
to a fence if the plaintiff had seen the fence and intended to purchase 
according to it. The court said it was not for the jury to find an inten-
tion of the plaintiff not indicated by his acts. Except for the reference 
in the instruction to the making of improvements in McKinney 11. 
Doane, it is difficult to square the dictum in that case with the ruling 
in Bast 11. Mason. The Supreme Court re-asserted the rule of the 
Atchison case in City of Laddonia 11. Day,214 the reported facts of 
which do not indicate whether anyone relied on the survey rather than 
the plat. The court seemed to be placing its preference for the plat 
over the survey on the ground of estoppel, without indicating why one 
needs that principle in order to recover on the basis of his muniments 
of title. The court added that this result was now required by a proper 
interpretation of a statute relating to the dedication of streets and 
alleys;215 that is, a city's title to a street, and the fixing of the boundaries 
thereof, must be governed solely by the procedures prescribed for the 
dedication of the street. McKinney 11. Doane was distinguished on the 
210 Id. at 495-496. 
211155 Mo. 287, 56 S.W. 304 (1900). 
212 Cf. Thrush v. Graybill, 110 Iowa 585, 81 N.W. 798 (1900); Rm:elle v. Lewis, 
37 Pa. Super. 563 (1908). 
21s 165 Mo. App. 718, 148 S.W. 398 (1912). 
214265 Mo. 383, 178 S.W. 741 (1915). 
215 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1909) §10294; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §445.070. 
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ground that there the monuments were still present on the ground and 
well known, while here none were shown to exist except by parol evi-
dence, which alone is not sufficient.216 Does the court mean to say 
that the rule of the Atchison case applies only where the .marks on the 
ground are "hidden," so that proof of the survey would depend solely 
on someone's testimony, but that sub-rule B will be applied where the 
marks on the ground remain visible at the time of the trial? If so does 
this amount to saying that where the marks are visible they will con-
stitute notice to anyone who purchases a lot affected by them? Such a 
conclusion clearly would be inconsistent with the decision of the court 
of appeals in Bast v. Mason; and it may be doubted that the Supreme 
Court today, simply on the authority of McKinney v. Doane and in 
spite of its other expressions on the question, would enforce sub-rule 
B in all cases where the surveyed lines or corners were not hidden. A 
more obvious basis for distinguishing McKinney v. Doane is to be 
found in the instruction which the court approved in that case. That 
instruction, it will be recalled, stated the issue in terms of what the 
grantee relied on when he purchased. Did he rely on the survey and 
take possession and improve his lot accordingly, or did he rely on the 
plat? The decision went on a :finding of reliance on the survey. On 
the other hand, there is nothing in the other Missouri cases to indicate 
that any party relied on surveyed boundaries. As in McKinney v. 
Doane, cases previously cited from other jurisdictions,217 in which sub-
rule B was applied, also indicate a reliance on the survey. Does this 
explain the striking contrast between the policy arguments offered by 
the court in Whitehead v. Atchison218 on the one hand and by Judge 
Cooley in Diehl v. Zanger219 on the other? Were not the two courts 
addressing themselves to different factual situations, which would 
naturally evoke different sympathies and the expression of apparently 
opposing policies? 
216 The Laddonia case was cited in dicta in later cases for the proposition that parties 
who purchase according to the same plat are bound by it. City of Pacific v. Ryan, 325 
Mo. 373 at 379, 28 S.W. (2d) 652 (1930); Wright v. City of Joplin, 275 Mo. 212 at 
224, 204 S.W. 910 (1918); Jackson v. Miller, (Mo. 1917) 195 S.W. 703 at 704. In 
Wright v. City of Joplin, supra, the court purported to apply the statutory rule announced 
in the Laddonia case, but in fact it seemed that that rule was not applicable, for the plat 
was ambiguous, and marked boundaries were held to control. In Macom v. Brewster, 273 
Mo. 616, 201 S.W. 547 (1918), the court followed the estoppel principle announced in 
the Laddonia case. It is significant here that if the decision had been otherwise and the 
survey preferred the defendant's house would have rested on the plaintiff's land. 
217 See cases cited note 203 supra. 
218 See quotation at note 210 supra. 
219 See quotation at note 190 supra. 
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In several of the cases applying sub-rule B the applicability of the 
rule to a bona :fide purchaser without notice of the marked lines was 
expressly reserved,220 or a party's claim to such status was denied as a 
:finding of fact. 221 But in one case the rule was applied against a party 
who seemed clearly to have a just claim to such a status.222 Mention 
should also be made of a number of cases the facts of which do not 
reveal that there was present any of the factors discussed above which 
might justifiably induce a court to prefer the survey to the plat.223 It 
is possible that one or more of these factors were present but not ade-
quately reported. On the other hand, it is possible that the rule was 
applied in these cases as a rule of construction, binding either subse-
quent bona fide purchasers or prior purchasers who did not participate 
in or know of the surveying of the lots prior to their sale and who did 
not later acquiesce therein. 
It has been suggested above that the decisions in most of the cases 
in which sub-rule B was applied might have been justified by the doc-
trines of acquiescence or reformation, and that to this extent the rule 
cannot be approved, because it is not needed, and also because it dis-
guises the real grounds for decision. Reference has also been made to 
other decisions which were not or may not have been so justified, and 
that to this extent the rule cannot be approved, because it produces 
wrong results. Is it possible that this classification does not exhaust 
the possibilities? Can a case be put in which equity and good con-
science, as well as the policy of modem title law, could be vindicated, 
or at least not unreasonably distorted, by protecting one who relies on 
surveyed boundaries, but whose case cannot be brought within the 
requirements of the doctrines either of acquiescence or of reformation? 
One may be tempted to say that it cannot, and that such a party must 
be held to the express terms of his deed. A satisfactory answer to this 
problem would require a detailed analysis of the principles of acquies-
cence and reformation in relation to the special factual problem here 
involved. No such analysis seems justified here. It must be admitted 
220 Thrush v. Graybill, ll0 Iowa 585, 81 N.W. 798 (1900); Bradstreet v. Dunham, 
65 Iowa 248, 21 N.W. 592 (1884); McKinney v. Doane, 155 Mo. 287, 56 S.W. 304 
(1900). 
221 Rozelle v. Lewis, 37 Pa. Super. 563 (1908). 
222Williams v. Spaulding, 29 Me. ll2 (1848). Cf. Linscott v. Fernald, 5 Me. 496 
(1829), cited notes 136 and 148 supra. 
223 Pyburn v. Campbell, 158 Ark. 321, 250 S.W. 15 (1923); O'Farrel v. Hamey, 51 
Cal. 125 (1875); Stetson v. Adams, 91 Me. 178, 39 A. 575 (1898); Bean v. Bachelder, 
78 Me. 184, 3 A. 279 (1886); Esmond v. Tarbox, 7 Me. 61 (1830); Hall v. Davis, 36 
N.H. 569 (1858); Taft v. Ward, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 124 S.W. 437 (1909); 
Fleischfresser v. Schmidt, 41 Wis. 223 (1876). 
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in passing, however, that the principles governing acquiescence are 
uncertain to the point of chaos; and it may be that in some jurisdictions 
they do not readily adapt to the present problem. For example, there 
is some authority that a boundary by acquiescence will be established 
only where there was some dispute or uncertainty over the proper 
boundary when the parties acted.224 It has even been held that a 
boundary agreed to under a mistaken belief that it was the true bound-
ary cannot be established by acquiescence.225 Or a time requirement 
. may be imposed for the continuance of acquiescence. So far as refor-
mation is concerned, it is not easy to bear the burden of proving the 
mutual mistake required for that remedy, especially where the contro-
versy is between others than the original grantor and grantee of a 
particular lot. And technical obstacles may exist here, too.226 
In view of these considerations, if our hypothetically meritorious 
case is to be correctly decided, it may be necessary to modify or adapt 
the doctrines referred to in their application to the present problem. 
The only other alternative consistent with the integrity of written 
instruments of title would be to denote the problem as sui generis and 
apply to it a rule, essentially equitable in nature, preferring the survey 
to the plat where this is necessary to vindicate the expectations of pur-
chasers of lots or to protect them in their reliance on marked or sur-
veyed boundaries. If the Missouri cases epitomize the typical factual 
variations of our problem, they may also epitomize the evolution of 
such a solution; for if McKinney v. Doane is still law, it is difficult to 
reconcile it with other decisions in that state except in some such terms 
as these. Either alternative, whether otherwise necessary or desirable, 
would be preferable to a rule which asserts that the survey must always 
prevail because it is the substance of a conveyance, while the plat is 
only a picture. As for courts which insist upon clinging to the rule 
because it is a simple and handy rule of thumb, the least that can be 
expected of them is an express qualification which will protect the 
interests of subsequent bona fide purchasers without notice of the 
survey. 
The specter which frightens courts in some of the cases is that of 
the effect of a ruling preferring the plat where over a large area the 
purchasers of lots may have relied on the survey. It is not perceived, 
however, how this more striking situation is materially different from 
the case where the discrepancy between plat and survey affects only 
224 See 69 A.L.R. 1430 at 1443 (1930). 
225 Id. at 1486. 
220 See, e.g., Holley v. May, (Fla. 1954) 75 S. (2d) 696; 149 A.L.R. 749 (1944). 
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the parties to the suit. It may be supposed that if one purchaser of a 
lot may have relief on the basis of his reliance on the survey, others 
will have the same rights. If some of these do not, this is not necessarily 
an occasion for consternation. It must also be kept in mind that if the 
rule is invariably applied, there is a similar if not greater cause for 
concern about a series of adjacent owners who may have purchased 
in reliance on the plat. 
Most difficult to justify are the statements of a few courts that a 
purchaser of a lot is entitled to rely on the surveyed boundaries as 
against those shown on the plat. There seems to be no reason for any 
presumption in favor of the survey. Conceding that there may be 
cases where one who in fact relies on the survey will be protected in 
such reliance, the presumption should be just the reverse. 
It is certainly the policy of the law to protect peaceable possession 
and to secure the recognized boundaries of owners of land. We may 
well seek to prevent one person from claiming a windfall at the expense 
of his neighbor on the basis of a plat of which he had previously taken 
little heed. But we should be as much interested in securing boundaries 
against those who claim similar windfalls on the basis of a previously 
unrecognized or unknown survey. The greatest vice in sub-rule B is 
that, while it may serve as a safeguard against land-grabbing in the one 
case, it is an invitation to land-grabbing in the other. Where the rule 
is in effect and unqualified, there is a good deal of force in one court's 
warning that a property owner "can know nothing of his boundaries."227 
III. CONCLUSION 
Parties to conveyances of land often contract with reference to 
existent physical boundaries or lines pointed out on the ground. Since 
descriptions in deeds are usually in technical terms, parties usually 
assume that they were drawn by persons who were competent to do 
so, and rarely do they think of the chance that what they agreed to 
was not what the deed called for. How often do purchasers insist on 
a survey to assure themselves on this point? This being the case, courts 
are disposed to find ways to protect parties in their reasonable expecta-
tions. It is entirely commendable that they should do so. Objections 
have been made in this article, however, to seeking this end in haste, 
by means of sweeping rules which leave disorder in their wake. There 
are well-established doctrines for reaching the desired end without 
227 Whitehead v. Atchison, 136 Mo. 485 at 495, 37 S.W. 928 (1896). 
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subverting other important doctrines. The inclination of a number 
of courts to take the short-cuts, as noted in this article, suggests that 
perhaps the established doctrines may not be always or entirely sat-
isfactory. Maybe they do not reach every meritorious case; maybe the 
orderly process is too cumbersome in its requirements; maybe some 
more simple, all-inclusive rule could be devised. I am not prepared to 
define such a rule at this time. I am certain only that the answer does 
not lie in the rules discussed herein. One further observation must be 
made. It seems evident that the effort to frame a solution should not 
even be attempted until that vast miscellany of diverse doctrine relating 
to boundaries by acquiescence has been further explored. It is to this 
task that the present writer, with many misgivings, intends next to turn. 
